Issues

Saturday, November 16, 2013

Khamenei's Wealth and Power - Part 3

The third part of the article is out at the Reuters Investigates site. Part 1 and Part 2 is also available.

Many of you will find this article interesting because it attempt to uncover/unravel Khamenei's grip of power and influence on Iran for the past 24 years by inspecting organizations that are directly under his patronage.

The first organization is Setad.

The organization's total worth is difficult to pinpoint because of the secrecy of its accounts. But Setad's holdings of real estate, corporate stakes and other assets total about $95 billion, Reuters has calculated. That estimate is based on an analysis of statements by Setad officials, data from the Tehran Stock Exchange and company websites, and information from the U.S. Treasury Department. Just one person controls that economic empire – Khamenei. Reuters found no evidence that Khamenei is tapping Setad to enrich himself. But Setad has empowered him. Through Setad, Khamenei has at his disposal financial resources whose value rivals the holdings of the shah, the Western-backed monarch who was overthrown in 1979.

With those revenues, the organization also helps to fund the ultimate seat of power in Iran, the Beite Rahbar, or Leader's House, according to a former Setad employee and other people familiar with the matter. The first supreme leader, Khomeini, had a small staff. To run the country today, Khamenei employs about 500 people in his administrative offices, many recruited from the military and security services.

Setad, however, is a much broader operation than these foundations. It's unclear how much of its revenue goes to philanthropy. Iranians whose properties have been seized by Setad, as well as lawyers who have handled such cases, dispute the argument that the organization is acting in the public interest. They described to Reuters what amounts to a methodical moneymaking scheme in which Setad obtains court orders under false pretenses to seize properties, and later pressures owners to buy them back or pay huge fees to recover them.

According to one of its co-founders, Setad was meant to last two years. But under Khamenei's control, it remained in business, amassing a giant portfolio of real estate by claiming in Iranian courts, sometimes falsely, that the properties were abandoned. In
fact, many were seized from members of religious minorities, and business people and other Iranians living abroad.

Khamenei appoints Setad's board of directors but delegates management of the organization to others, according to one former employee. This person said the supreme leader is primarily concerned about one thing: its annual profits, which he uses to fund his bureaucracy.

As expected, the authors of this article couldn't get any comments or feedbacks from the people in charge of the organization. Even the Iranians that are currently serving in the governmental sectors are refusing to cooperate.

The second organization is the powerful Guards
"The Revolutionary Guards, the powerful military unit tasked with protecting Iran from both domestic and foreign threats, has long held a pivotal role in the country's economy, with extensive holdings in defense, construction and oil industries, according to the U.S. State Department.

According to Mohsen Sazegara, a co-founder of the Revolutionary Guards who is now in exile in the United States, Khamenei allowed the Guards to enter the construction business. That opening eventually enabled an engineering division of the Guards to evolve into a major conglomerate. In time the Guards became a pillar of Khamenei's power. So too did Setad.
"

The Guardian Council http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardian_Council

Even before then, Setad had been drawing attention from the reformist wing of the establishment. During Khatami's second term, moderate members of parliament sought to investigate Setad, according to Nayyeri. The Guardian Council, a body of conservative clerics and jurists who are directly or indirectly appointed by Khamenei, issued a declaration that Setad was beyond parliament's authority, Nayyeri said.

Elections in 2008 brought a strongly conservative parliament deeply loyal to Khamenei. In one of its first steps, parliament amended its bylaws to limit its own power to audit institutions under the supreme leader's supervision, except with his permission.

"This is the reason why no one knows what is going on inside these organizations," says Sazegara, the Guards co-founder.

Today, Khamenei's power in some respects exceeds that of his predecessor. He lacks the religious authority of Khomeini but has far greater resources at his disposal.

Khomeini operated from a modest house in northern Tehran with a small staff. Khamenei lives in a large compound in Tehran. The grounds contain a variety of buildings, including a large hall where Khamenei gives speeches. Setad helps to finance his administrative offices, which are known as Beite Rahbar, the Leader's House, according to a former senior Setad employee and other people familiar with its operations. It employs about 500 people, many recruited from the Guards and security services.

This is what I concluded from the article:
The authors stated that Khamenei never fails to portray himself as a highly religious and pious/modest scholar. Everyone agrees to that at least. The authors wanted us to disregard that for a moment, and examine the way he has consolidated his powers and wealth via private organizations (Setad, Revolutionary Guard,) that are not very transparent and are ridiculously faithful only to him. By giving these examples, one can compare the current supreme leader with the previous one; and unlike Khomeini, Khamenei is running a huge beuracray (thousands of time larger).

Authors attempted to highlight that Khameini is sitting comfortably on billions of dollars supposedly invested by his "companies" that supposedly work for the good of people. But since these organizations are only accountable to Khamenei and Khamenei is not accountable to anyone, so there's a disconnect between Khameini's public personality with what is going on privately in the background.

I think what is lacking in this article is maybe some more details or discussion on why the Leader of Iran needs his own private personal army and why he is operating these secretive and private organizations away from the other branches of the government or seperate from the office of the Presidency. Based on my observation, most of the supporters of the Wilayah al-Faqih system (Supreme Leader) claim that he is entitled to all these because of his position as the Supreme Leader. This doesn't really sit well with me because Shias generally don't believe in a temporal power on earth, at least not in the curent Era. I don't think Shias should make an exception for Iran due to a political system. Because everyone knows that this style of thinking has created many dictatorship with lifetime tenures. Look around you, they are everywhere.


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