I'm summarizing the article here. Author’s original writing is also quoted properly.
At the start of the paper, the author quoted something from the Economist magazine about Fadlallah passing away.
No one of his stature can now gently counter Hizbullah’s claim to represent all Lebanese Shias or question its fealty to Iran. And there is one less ayatollah to challenge Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in his claim to lead all the world’s Shias.(Economist 2010)
Author highlighted possible choices for Lebanese Shias among the prominent marajas. I'm paraphrasing here.
- Khamenei. He would bring the Wilayah al-Faqih baggage on board.
- Sistani. His political engagement is very limited. His rules and opinions are very conservative and traditional. If you are already a fan of Fadlallah’s free thinking style, then you are probably not going to be happy with Sistani.
- Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayyad, the second most senior cleric in Iraq after Sistani.
- Muhammad Ibrahim Jannati, an Iranian Ayatullah.
The article had this to say about Fadlallah's and his office view on Taqlid
Shortly after Fadlallah’s death, his office announced on their website that it was permissible for those who emulated Fadlallah to continue to do so as long as a living religious authority deemed it permissible. A subsequent statement on(bayynat.org) affirmed that it is also permissible for those who have never emulated Fadlallah during his lifetime to start emulating him under the same circumstances. In response to inquiries as to whether or how Fadlallah is to be followed when new issues arise, the office clarified that new issues must be referred to a living religious authority while at the same time affirming that Fadlallah comprehensively covered modern issues so that, at least in the short term, his opinions might suffice (see ‘Inquiries on Emulation’).
Still pretty confusing. How do you emulate a dead scholar? And why on earth would you pay a lip service to a dead scholar and then keep sending questions to other scholars? Can’t really blame the office though. The problem originates from Fadlallah’s own bizarre idea of Taqlid and I guess no one in the office seems to know how to proceed from here.
The article delve into Hizbullah (Nasrallah’s organization). The many members of that organization may seek Fadhlalah's advice on a variety of issues but on political matters, Ali Khamenei has the final say on everything (political).
The article traced some of Fadhlallah’s statements where he strongly rejected being the spiritual advisor of Nasrallah’s organization. The author is of the view that the relationship between Fadhlallah and Nasrallah/his organization is somewhat ‘strain'. Here's one of Fadlallah's statement:
The Lebanese Muslim youths have also benefited from my knowledge before Hezbollah was founded. And when Hezbollah was founded I was not a part of it and I used to tell them: ‚I am not a part of you because I do not engage in party politics. But, when you ask my opinion on some positions, I support them if I agree with them, otherwise I do not support them‛. (Fadlallah 2007)
I don't think one or two statements here and there mean much. Unless these statements are very serious in nature.
After presenting a glowing review about Fadhullah’s religious credentials, the author describe Fadhallah as a critic of the Wilayah al-Faqih system.
Fadhallah supported Khomeini's revolution, but he also followed his teacher al-Khoei. We have seen in other post that al-Khoei doesn’t really agrees to Khomeini's political ideology.
Then the author presented some background of Fadlallah becoming an independent or self-proclaimed marja.
Fadlallah was Al-Khoei's representative until 1992. He then followed Rida Gulypagani briefly until 1993. Later on, he followed al-Sistani. Finally becoming the marja himself
Author's quotes here
Thus, in 1994, Fadlallah decided to claim marja status for himself, despite the exhortation of Ahmad Jannati, who flew to Beirut as Khamenei’s personal envoy with the task of dissuading Fadlallah from declaring his marja‘iyyah .
As the highest ranking Arab marja.Fadlallah cultivates a considerable following throughout the region. Many Shi‘A in Lebanon, Syria and various Gulf countries such as Bahrain and Iraq, view him and not Khamenei as the model for emulation (marja‘al taqlid) . He has offices in Syria, Iran, the U.K, Germany and the Ivory Coast (Maktab Fadlallah 2003)
The author summarized Fadhlallah’s view about Wilayah al Faqih quite well.
Fadlallah argues that all practicable routes toward the establishment of Islamic government should be pursued, but the idea of governing according the decisions of the mujutahid is not seen by him as very practical. Fadlallah refers to wilayat al-faqih as a juridical not a belief. Further, in light of the fact of the silence of the faqih and the fact of the multiplicity of fuqaha as well as the fact of the inevitable contradiction of their decisions, Fadlallah deems the notion of an absolute jurist is untenable. All jurists, no matter how wise, remain fallible, like all other believers. While arguing in some of his speeches and writings that Khomeini’s interpretation can be justified in the interest of safeguarding the community (e.g. 2000b, esp. 163)
Author quoted an example of where Fadlallah disagreed and corrected Nasrallah's general misunderstanding about an Islamic principle.
There have also been occasions when Fadlallah has taken the party to task for claiming to hold a monopoly on truth. For example, Nasrallah gave a speech prior to the 2005 election in which he declared it a taklif al-shar‘I (an obligation based on Islamic law) for Shi‘a to vote for the list Hizbullah endorsed. Fadlallah replied by using his 31 May 2005 column, The Stance of the Week’, to vehemently criticize the use of taklif shar‘I in the elections, arguing that such practices exploit Islamic concepts for political purposes(Fadlallah 2005)
According to Fadlallah, God has granted each person an independent mind for which we are each individually responsible. While an individual of religious learning might be able to advise Muslims not to vote for corrupt candidates, the individual must decide for his or herself which candidate is corrupt and which is not.
Reference
[1] Michaelle Browers. "Fadlallah and the Passing of Lebanon's Last Najafi Generation." Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies 5.1 (2012): 25-46.
salam
ReplyDeletecan u share with me the link of this article about sayed (ra) ?
This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
ReplyDeleteHere's the link to the journal. I've left the reference in my post, you should be able to look it up
ReplyDeletehttp://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_shia_islamic_studies/toc/isl.5.1.html
but i want to read the full article
ReplyDeletecan u give the link of that full article
the link which u gave that is only abstract
The link contains full articles both in html and also pdf. I dont understand why you cannot access them. They are free and open to public. I'm accessing from my home pc. No, I dont have any special settings.
ReplyDelete