This is part 3. Please click on the link for Part 1 and 2.
Just a reminder, I am not reproducing every pages from the article. I am only posting materials that have something to do with the topic at hand.
We already looked at the narratives from a few explorers. The author then started discussing the sustainability of the religious class when the revenue from the state is no longer there. The Afghan Qajar Sunni rule in Iran stopped paying stipends to the Shia Ulamas. The Qajar government, by the year 1740, has already usurped all the Shia endowments from the religious class.
Meanwhile, the Iraqi clerics who still possess their sources of revenues from Zakat and Khums, were in a better condition than their Persian counterparts.
These sources of income sustained the religious Shi'ite leaders in the Iraqi shrine cities throughout the late 1700s and formed the basis of their financial independence to pursue their religious and scholarly objectives.
The next discussion was on how the Usooli scholars gain momentum starting from the time of Qajar Persia.
The next few pages are not very relevant with the topic at hand. Later on the discussion was about the sources of revenues of the religious class from state endowments (stipends, pensions, and functions)
Important ulama and sayyids received stipends and pensions as well as money and other presents during festivals. The leading ulama received large amounts of tithes, alms, and gifts from the believers. The amount of these payments was substantial.
Many of the religious professionals, particularly sayyids, begged or, rather, demanded alms, on the ground of their holy character. The demanding behavior, termed mulla bazi, was not limited to the lower levels of the religious class. In Isfahan the ulama demanded, and obtained by force if need be, one-third of the property if somebody died.
The ulama did this in their own quarter, and the imam-juma all over town (asking yakhasht, or one-eighth). The imam-jum 'a would send an agent who would seal all rooms in a house, even going so far as delaying the burial preparations. The justification for this behavior was that they claimed that the deceased during his life had not paid the khums and zakat tax and/or the sahm i Imam (the Imam's share). There were also religious scholars, such as Muhammad Madi Naraqi, who criticized the hereditary sayyid class for their assumption that piety is an innate quality obtained through lineage.
The sayyids drew so much attention to themselves because they were a kind of religious hereditary nobility, and entitled to part of the khums tax under Shi'i law. Consequently, "it is an act of greater savab (act of merit) to give to a drunken seyid than to the most deserving beggar."
Dieulofoy reported that by 1880 this custom had largely fallen into disuse, though in the large towns, such as Isfahan, where sayyids were numerous they continued to exert much influence and impose themselves in particular on small shopkeepers who did not have the clout to oppose them.
Sayyids therefore enjoyed prestige and this led to a proliferation of sayyids (fabricated or not) because of the material reward this position offered. Many true believers cheated the Imam out of his share by conniving with his descendants, who, for a fair remuneration, would hand out a signed statement that the religious obligatory payment had been truly effected.
To increase their fair share, many people also would dress up their children and/or relatives as beggars and would grant these fake poor their share of the bounty for the poor. If they were religious
professionals they could keep the rest for themselves. Sometimes rich persons, including
religious professionals, did not pay their full contribution either.
To be continued...
Showing posts with label people. Show all posts
Showing posts with label people. Show all posts
Thursday, February 2, 2012
Sunday, January 29, 2012
Real or Fake Sayyeds? -- part 2
This is part 2. Part 1 is here.
As among the rest of society, among sayyids also there were prominent families, such as the Tabataba'is, whose credentials were well-known and acknowledged. However, it was also a well-known fact that many sayyids had no claim to such distinction.
These fake sayyids took advantage of the reverence and the pecuniary [monetary] benefits paid to sayyids by presenting themselves as a legitimate sayyid in communities that did not know them.
It was sufficient to put on a green belt or turban, for even to question the validity of the claim to sayyidship was considered to be blasphemy.
Whereas the Tabataba'is have a recognized family tree, these self-made sayyids had such family trees fabricated in the Shi'ite shrine cities in Iraq, in particular from Samarra, and were therefore referred to
as Samarra sayyids.
In fact, according to Dieulafoy, only four families in Persia were recognized as having a legitimate—though even there on disputable grounds—claim of descent from Ali.
This was also reflected in the large number of imamzadahs, or tombs of alleged descendants of the Shi'ite Imams.
The chief professor of the madrasa at Qazvin told the Dieulofoys, for example, that he was quite aware that in Persia alone there were more than 20 imamzadahs claiming to house the ashes of the same sayyid, in addition to those in the country where the sayyid had or even had not lived at all. However, the point was, according to this 'alim, one did not really need the ashes of the imamzadah to dedicate a tomb in his honor and pray to him.
As a consequence, the number of sayyids was large. "Persia swarms with Saiyids, a lazy, worthless set of men as a rule, who do not work and expect to be fed by others, and the Turkoman Khojah is the same," according to Yate.
Other contemporary European observers concurred with Yate's opinion. According to Polak, the sayyids as a group represented as many as 2 percent of the entire population.
Another nineteenth-century source estimates their number even higher, that is, at 20 percent of the urban population, which cannot be right, but indicates that the impression existed that sayyids were omnipresent,a hard-to-avoid urban phenomenon. In rural areas sayyids sometimes dominated a village's population, as, for example, in the Khabujan area in Khorasan.
To be continued..
As among the rest of society, among sayyids also there were prominent families, such as the Tabataba'is, whose credentials were well-known and acknowledged. However, it was also a well-known fact that many sayyids had no claim to such distinction.
These fake sayyids took advantage of the reverence and the pecuniary [monetary] benefits paid to sayyids by presenting themselves as a legitimate sayyid in communities that did not know them.
It was sufficient to put on a green belt or turban, for even to question the validity of the claim to sayyidship was considered to be blasphemy.
Whereas the Tabataba'is have a recognized family tree, these self-made sayyids had such family trees fabricated in the Shi'ite shrine cities in Iraq, in particular from Samarra, and were therefore referred to
as Samarra sayyids.
In fact, according to Dieulafoy, only four families in Persia were recognized as having a legitimate—though even there on disputable grounds—claim of descent from Ali.
This was also reflected in the large number of imamzadahs, or tombs of alleged descendants of the Shi'ite Imams.
The chief professor of the madrasa at Qazvin told the Dieulofoys, for example, that he was quite aware that in Persia alone there were more than 20 imamzadahs claiming to house the ashes of the same sayyid, in addition to those in the country where the sayyid had or even had not lived at all. However, the point was, according to this 'alim, one did not really need the ashes of the imamzadah to dedicate a tomb in his honor and pray to him.
As a consequence, the number of sayyids was large. "Persia swarms with Saiyids, a lazy, worthless set of men as a rule, who do not work and expect to be fed by others, and the Turkoman Khojah is the same," according to Yate.
Other contemporary European observers concurred with Yate's opinion. According to Polak, the sayyids as a group represented as many as 2 percent of the entire population.
Another nineteenth-century source estimates their number even higher, that is, at 20 percent of the urban population, which cannot be right, but indicates that the impression existed that sayyids were omnipresent,a hard-to-avoid urban phenomenon. In rural areas sayyids sometimes dominated a village's population, as, for example, in the Khabujan area in Khorasan.
To be continued..
Saturday, January 28, 2012
Real or Fake Sayyeds?
Sayyeds are the descendent of the Holy Prophet from his daughter Fatima.
There are millions of Sayyeds around the world (almost in every
countries). Sayyeds generally enjoy a greater degree of respectability and honor in the community due to them being given the privilege of being related
to the Holy Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and his daughter Fatima.
As the years pass by, the genealogical chart/family tree of the Sayyeds became more complex with the number of them increasing rapidly. You lose track of some of your family members (i.e inter marrying with the local population who may not be Sayyed-aware, re-location to other part of the world etc).
As to be expected, when family connection can gain you that extra leverage/advantage, material or non-material, then everyone would be tempted to have that special connection to the family of the Prophet of Islam, especially when the rewards are far greater than the risk. The risk of being exposed is almost negligible. Most people are not even aware of their own ancestors much less other's ancestors. This certainly explains why we have a very large number of Sayyeds in the world today who may not even be remotely related to the Holy Prophet, either knowingly or unknowingly.
I promised to reproduce some sections from an article that I read recently. This article may give some insight into the emergence of fake Sayyeds in the Middle east. Unfortunately, it seems to be a lengthy piece and contains many tangential discussion. So, I am only going to post the most significant part of the article. Please read the original article if you wish to learn more. I cannot really verify the authenticity of this material. I am just not knowledgeable enough in this area. So, please read the following section with a grain of salt.
This is an excerpt from an original article found in a book. Footnotes have been removed for a better reading experience. The following sub-sections are created (here) to organize the information.
On page 55 of the book[1], the author of the article described the economical condition in Qajar Persia and its demographics
Demographics
Data are reported by the Russian traveler Shopen in 1852: that in Urdubad, a small town with about 3,500 inhabitants, the high-ranking ulama represented 1 percent, the mullas 2 percent, and sayyids 31 percent of the population. In Erivan, a town of 11,500 inhabitants, there was a mulla for every 100 Moslems. There were 50 mulla and 39 sayyid families, which represented less than 1 percent of the population.
in Akda, a village of 1,200 inhabitants, the British frontier commission received a visit from the 5 principal men of the place—4 of whom were sayyids, out of 100 in the village. Some villages consisted almost entirely of sayyids, but these were exception to the rule that the number of religious professionals who lived in villages were few. In the tribal areas very few religious professionals were found. Tribal chiefs might have a mulla in their entourage, "who acted as secretary and chaplain."
Clerics and Scholars
"The priesthood of Persia are almost all Syeds," Malcolm reports. Polak goes even farther, stating that you can only become a mujtahid, shaykh al-islam, or imam-jum a if you are a sayyid. Indeed it would seem that sayyids dominated those functions throughout the nineteenth century in Qajar Persia as they did the ranks of the ulama (35%) in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala. Their number was probably higher among the ulama in Persia itself, because the religious community in the shrine cities constituted a more open system. The sadat-e 'ali, or first-rank sayyids, occupied the leading religious
functions, in particular those granted by the state and the well-paid functions in the shrines. The lower-class sayyids had to fend for themselves in the market, as we will see.
Nevertheless, the ulama were a much more open group than any other social class. Also, they were more inclined to reward piety and scholarly excellence than family ties.
Litvak has shown that non-clerical origins dominated among ulama who immigrated to the shrine cities, as opposed to those born there. On the other hand, many who held "hereditary" religious functions often did not study in [the] Iraqi shrine cities, but in Persia itself, thus maintaining a more closed system.
The working-class religious professionals included the rural mullas, the managers of small shrines, mosques, and madrasas (seminaries), and further, low-level teachers at the madrasas and the Qur'anic schools (maktab), the pulpit preachers and reciters of panegyrics, seminarians (tullab), and the lower-class sayyids. All these were financially and otherwise dependent on their masters.
The Razavis, or descendants of Imam Reza, enjoyed special privileges in Mashhad, where the Imam Reza is buried, and "comparatively few of them apparently work for their living."
Descendants of 'Ali through his offspring from other women are called 'Alavi sayyids.
Although it all started with a woman, Fatima, sayyids who were descended from a male sayyid were known as sharif and ranked higher than those who were descended from a sayyida mother only.
Because of their descent, sayyids enjoyed general respect and immunity from normal state regulations. Therefore, a chief sayyid was responsible for the behavior of the sayyids, for only a sayyid could judge another sayyid. In the past such a chief sayyid was called naqib al-ashraf or naqib
al-mamalek, but in Qajar times this official was generally referred to as ra'is-e sadat. The
naqib was the overseer of all dervish groups.
Please continue to read part 2.
Reference
[1] Walbridge, Linda S. (2001). The Most Learned of the Shi`a: The Institution of the Marja Taqlid. USA: Oxford University Press. p. 55. ISBN 978-0-1951-3799-6.
As the years pass by, the genealogical chart/family tree of the Sayyeds became more complex with the number of them increasing rapidly. You lose track of some of your family members (i.e inter marrying with the local population who may not be Sayyed-aware, re-location to other part of the world etc).
As to be expected, when family connection can gain you that extra leverage/advantage, material or non-material, then everyone would be tempted to have that special connection to the family of the Prophet of Islam, especially when the rewards are far greater than the risk. The risk of being exposed is almost negligible. Most people are not even aware of their own ancestors much less other's ancestors. This certainly explains why we have a very large number of Sayyeds in the world today who may not even be remotely related to the Holy Prophet, either knowingly or unknowingly.
I promised to reproduce some sections from an article that I read recently. This article may give some insight into the emergence of fake Sayyeds in the Middle east. Unfortunately, it seems to be a lengthy piece and contains many tangential discussion. So, I am only going to post the most significant part of the article. Please read the original article if you wish to learn more. I cannot really verify the authenticity of this material. I am just not knowledgeable enough in this area. So, please read the following section with a grain of salt.
This is an excerpt from an original article found in a book. Footnotes have been removed for a better reading experience. The following sub-sections are created (here) to organize the information.
On page 55 of the book[1], the author of the article described the economical condition in Qajar Persia and its demographics
Demographics
Data are reported by the Russian traveler Shopen in 1852: that in Urdubad, a small town with about 3,500 inhabitants, the high-ranking ulama represented 1 percent, the mullas 2 percent, and sayyids 31 percent of the population. In Erivan, a town of 11,500 inhabitants, there was a mulla for every 100 Moslems. There were 50 mulla and 39 sayyid families, which represented less than 1 percent of the population.
in Akda, a village of 1,200 inhabitants, the British frontier commission received a visit from the 5 principal men of the place—4 of whom were sayyids, out of 100 in the village. Some villages consisted almost entirely of sayyids, but these were exception to the rule that the number of religious professionals who lived in villages were few. In the tribal areas very few religious professionals were found. Tribal chiefs might have a mulla in their entourage, "who acted as secretary and chaplain."
Clerics and Scholars
"The priesthood of Persia are almost all Syeds," Malcolm reports. Polak goes even farther, stating that you can only become a mujtahid, shaykh al-islam, or imam-jum a if you are a sayyid. Indeed it would seem that sayyids dominated those functions throughout the nineteenth century in Qajar Persia as they did the ranks of the ulama (35%) in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala. Their number was probably higher among the ulama in Persia itself, because the religious community in the shrine cities constituted a more open system. The sadat-e 'ali, or first-rank sayyids, occupied the leading religious
functions, in particular those granted by the state and the well-paid functions in the shrines. The lower-class sayyids had to fend for themselves in the market, as we will see.
Nevertheless, the ulama were a much more open group than any other social class. Also, they were more inclined to reward piety and scholarly excellence than family ties.
Litvak has shown that non-clerical origins dominated among ulama who immigrated to the shrine cities, as opposed to those born there. On the other hand, many who held "hereditary" religious functions often did not study in [the] Iraqi shrine cities, but in Persia itself, thus maintaining a more closed system.
The working-class religious professionals included the rural mullas, the managers of small shrines, mosques, and madrasas (seminaries), and further, low-level teachers at the madrasas and the Qur'anic schools (maktab), the pulpit preachers and reciters of panegyrics, seminarians (tullab), and the lower-class sayyids. All these were financially and otherwise dependent on their masters.
The Razavis, or descendants of Imam Reza, enjoyed special privileges in Mashhad, where the Imam Reza is buried, and "comparatively few of them apparently work for their living."
Descendants of 'Ali through his offspring from other women are called 'Alavi sayyids.
Although it all started with a woman, Fatima, sayyids who were descended from a male sayyid were known as sharif and ranked higher than those who were descended from a sayyida mother only.
Because of their descent, sayyids enjoyed general respect and immunity from normal state regulations. Therefore, a chief sayyid was responsible for the behavior of the sayyids, for only a sayyid could judge another sayyid. In the past such a chief sayyid was called naqib al-ashraf or naqib
al-mamalek, but in Qajar times this official was generally referred to as ra'is-e sadat. The
naqib was the overseer of all dervish groups.
Please continue to read part 2.
Reference
[1] Walbridge, Linda S. (2001). The Most Learned of the Shi`a: The Institution of the Marja Taqlid. USA: Oxford University Press. p. 55. ISBN 978-0-1951-3799-6.
Friday, December 2, 2011
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