The Sunni love triangle

The love triangle between the ISIS (Islamic State) jihadist and Saddam’s ex-Bathists and with the Arab Iraqi Sunni will not last very long. All of the groups mentioned above have a very contradictory ideology and aspiration.

ISIS Jihadist is made up of mainly foreign fighters, indoctrinated with hard-core Wahabi ideology who wishes to establish a fantasy caliphate stretching from east to the west using extreme military force.

The ex-Bathists are a bunch of secular socialists who has preferred Saddam’s dictatorship in the past and don’t really have a strong religious inclination (most of them are atheist anyway). Ex-Bathists want to destabilize the current government and by doing so, they hope to gain back most of the political and military powers which was lost in the second gulf war.

The Iraqi Arab Sunnis who don’t at all share the ISIS interpretation of Islam wants to preserve wealth, power, and the way of life which has further deteriorate under Maliki government.

Apart from the clear differences in ideologies among these groups, Iraqis are also very proud people. They would never listen to this fake caliph or submit to his foreign fighters. ISIS also doesn't believe in power sharing. They have their own religious-politico hierarchy.

This love relationship will probably not last very long.

What’s going on in Iraq

Sometimes reading Iraq related news from the schools of western journalism can be very frustrating, especially when they are not telling you anything new, news-worthy or even interesting. Yesterday, I was reading a news site that stated ‘The Kurds have moved into the Northern Iraqi cities to safe guard their interest in Iraq’. This is old story Mr/Ms journalist. Kurds secured their interest weeks ago. You are not reporting anything new here.

The Iraqi government bombed some of the ISIS targets and claimed some sort victory. I don’t know how successful the Iraqis will be fighting against the ISIS in the short term via air raid only. Does air power really works considering the apostates of ISIS (Islamic state) are hiding among the Sunnis who are not yet ready to rid them off until the central government of al-Maliki resigned? This is a delicate situation. While you really need to remove the terrorists who are hiding among the Sunnis, you still wanna make sure that not too many Sunnis become casualties of war or collateral damage because we don’t want everyone to be inflamed further. Iraq cannot continue to be in a war-like state indefinitely. Only terrorists win by making the whole country instable.

I hope the monkeys from the ISIS are reading the news especially what the leader of the Sunni Arab tribes said a few days ago. The ISIS/ISIL is useful to their agenda but once/if Maliki met their demand, they (the Iraqi Sunnis) are going to slaughter the ISIS fighters like dogs.

What’s going on with the Shiite? Some of the Shiite still felt betrayal from al-Maliki and are still mad and bitter at him for reigning in their new found freedom. Maliki has also fought with some of their leaders who were a little bit more extreme. Now, Maliki needs their help to fight the ex-Baathists and the Jihadist Sunnis. I think this new threat of terrorism from ISIS has brought the Shiite closer together. They have far more important things to worry about …the murderers that are coming after them and their family and the politicians who either don’t care enough or are not competent enough to stop the terrorists.

Going back to the Kurds, I think they are watching the ISIS closely and waiting for something to happen before doing anything? Most of the Kurds don’t think they belong in a unified Iraq under a strong central government but are they waiting until most of Baghdad razes to ground so they can have a stronger claim to their statehood? But what if Maliki gets all the support he needs and manages to demolish or pushes the ISIS terrorist out of Iraq? Wouldn’t Maliki and for that matter the Shias of Iraq become angry with this clear show of unfaithfulness coming from the Kurds and the Arab Sunnis?

Sistani, Iraqi Sunnis and How to Govern?

Sistani has emerged recently and communicate with his spokesperson numerous times last month and this month. Sistani has said that the time has come for all Iraqis to defend the country, the ISIS rebels are apostate and it is permissible to fight them to death and the politics in Iraq must now move forward to form a stable and a respected government. Whenever Sistani says something, his friends and also his opponents/enemies tend to twist and interpret his messages/fatwas in a way that is most favorable to them and their causes. At the end of the day, you don’t actually hear what Sistani said, just what people think he’s thinking via his fatwa. I was a little bit surprised when I read the Friday sermon from his representative. I was under the impression that Sistani was badly burned in the political process, was done with it and want nothing to do with it. But it seems that this time something is very different.

Everyone is saying that the situation in Iraq has reached a critical stage. I don’t think so. Iraq has always been that way throughout the ages. There’s something seriously wrong with that country and you can’t even reasonably explain why.

The Iraqi Arab Sunnis are still using delay tactics when confronted with the extremist jihadist (ISIS); in order to score some political points in the post-Saddam Iraq.

Some Sunnis are slowly realizing that their future doesn’t really lies with the ISIS. Some have expressed clear intent in supporting the government if al-Maliki just goes away. I don’t really understand how democracy is supposed to work in Sunnis favor considering that the population of the non-Shiite Arab is just 15%; they don’t really have much leverage number-wise. Any prolong fight in Iraq will just benefit the Shiite more than anyone else because they are the only one who have strengths in numbers more than anyone else currently.

The city of Samarra is a little bit explosive right now. The ISIS terrorist seems to want to destroy the tomb and the mosque of the two of the Shia Imams (this site is very holy and dear to Shia world-wide). The site is well-guarded right now but it has been destroyed before by the Sunni extremists.

The other news of the day is that the Sunnis are again suggesting that they are probably better off with a slice of Iraq (a semi-autonomous region just like what the Kurd is having right now). I think it’s silly to be splitting the country in smaller regions and factions on the sectarian (Shia or Sunna) basis or race (Arab or Kurd) among the folks who already hate each other and will continue to do so many years in the future just because everyone is not getting what they really want today?

References
[1] http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/29/uk-iraq-security-clerics-insight-idUKKBN0F30KZ20140629
[2] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-07/sunni-tribes-to-fight-on-until-iraq-s-maliki-goes-leader-says.html
[3] http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-07-07/sunni-tribes-to-fight-on-until-iraq-s-maliki-goes-leader-says

Tough Choices ahead for the Iraqi Arab Sunnis

The semi-traitorous Iraqi Arab Sunnis has two tough choices ahead. Now that they don’t have their favorite dictator running the show in Iraq, should they put their trust and future in the hands of the imbecile foreign Jihadist from the ISIS/ISIL or to their still semi-functional but deeply incompetent government of al-Maliki?

I’m reading news today that the Sunnis are having second thoughts about their initial enthusiasm and show of support for the ISIS terrorist.

The Sunni Muslims in Iraq who welcomed the militant group in early June. They all share the goal of overthrowing Iraq's Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his sectarian rule, but the more secular parts of the Sunni coalition didn't sign up for an Islamic state.

"By announcing the caliphate, they are picking a fight with everybody," says David Kilcullen, a guerrilla warfare expert and former chief counter-terrorism strategist for the U.S. State Department.

"No, no, there is nothing like that in Mosul," insists a former Iraqi military officer when reached by phone. He dismisses the caliphate with a snort, because, he says, "the other groups object." The former officer says he fears retribution from the Maliki government and didn't want his name published. He says he is part of the Sunni alliance in Mosul that originally welcomed the Islamic State. Now, he has some doubts. "We will soon name one of our people to be the boss in Mosul," he says. "There is no caliphate here."

The self-declared caliphate had immediate detractors. Rival groups fighting in Syria were the first to speak against the caliphate. IS has already hijacked the Syrian revolt, turning a citizen's rebellion into a terrorist war.

"In Iraq, 99 percent of the Sunni Arabs don't want to live under a caliphate," says Ali Khedery. "Iraqis like to drink, dance, and smoke. They don't want to be ruled by Chechens and Afghans and live under 7th-century standards,"

I think it’s wise of the Iraqi Sunnis to wise up. Iraq has a rich diversity, cultural, historical, social and scientific tradition that is very unique to the Iraqi. While everyone always assume Iraq is a Shia Holy Land but Iraq is also the birthplace and learning center of Sunnism and many other Islamic sects. This is the place where people were actually promoting the thinking of Islam and not merely parroting what they heard someone else said who heard from someone else who probably didn’t hear from anyone. Can the Sunnis of Iraq support the barbaric mentality of the ISIS foreigners who would destroy Iraq’s culture heritage and society if/when they come to power? Just because someone claims to share your religion, should we be stupid enough to assume that they also have your best interest at heart?

Maliki, Iraq’s prime minister, has not been very successful at countering the rebels. He blamed his failure on the sectarian nature of the Iraqi society and some of the neighboring countries for supporting the rebels. I think it’s tough to be in al-Maliki shoes. He’s supposed to make diplomacy work in a crazy country like Iraq ….

Reference
[1] http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/07/03/328145985/have-the-islamist-militants-overreached-in-iraq-and-syria

Iranian Influence in Iraq

I personally don't think the Iranians have that much political influence in Iraq but many people think the Iranians are wielding a lot of power in Iraq. They sees their own politicians (Iraqi) visiting Iran and paying respect to their dignitaries and generally being friendly towards their eastern neighbor.

An explanation given by them is that these politicians and their parties (e.g. The Dawa party) were backed/supported by Iran in the past when they were fighting Saddam's regime.

There's much corruption in Iraq. Iraq has also been recognized by many to be a failed state. [1][2]

Over a decade after independence from the Butcher of Baghdad, and after having a government in place (even if imperfect), the same old questions about the rule of clerics in politic is resurfacing albeit from a different angle.

In 2003, prior to the election and the establishment of the post-Saddam government, everyone wanted to know (fearfully I might add) if the clerics in Iraq are going to take over the government? Will the the Iranian Political System/ Wilayah al Faqih (ruling by a Jurist) be exported in


Reference
[1] http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2018571162_iraq01.html
[2] http://thegroundtruth.blogspot.com/2009/07/iraq-ranked-no-6-on-failed-state-list.html

Egyptian Military PR Embarrassment

Egypt is still under the military dictatorship. The military has done everything it could to suppress the people and silenced the opposition especially from the Islamic brotherhood who were formally voted in the power by a very narrow margin. Now, to legitimize their rule, the military and their backers have written a new constitution for Egypt and has publicize this “achievement” as a great victory for all. It didn’t turn out as well as they expected.

A campaign to win support for a draft of Egypt’s new constitution got off to a rocky start on Sunday, one month ahead of a referendum, when observers noticed that a banner promoting the document misspelled the word for “Egyptians” in Arabic and used stock images of foreigners to stand in for representative citizens.

Within hours of the campaign’s launch, journalists and bloggers discovered that three of the five Egyptians pictured on the banner were apparently not Egyptians at all, and suspicions grew that the makers of the poster had simply searched Google to find stock images of “a doctor,” “a businesswoman,” “a farmer,” “a man with Down syndrome” and “an Egyptian soldier.”

Image of the doctor had previously been used on the American site ehowtogetridofstretchmarks.com; the stock image of the businesswoman already graced the home page of an Irish professional networking site; and the image of the man with Down syndrome illustrated an article in an Arizona business magazine last year.

Here's a poster mocking the original banner -made up of aliens.

Reference
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/16/egyptians-mock-ads-promoting-new-constitution-with-typos-and-stock-images/?_r=1

We have a Deal Now

Iran has reached a new deal with world's six super powers to temporarily curb its nuclear program in exchange for relief from the sanctions. You can see the detail of the agreement here.

The crucial part of the agreement is this:

Iran will stop enriching uranium beyond 5%, and will stop development of their Arak nuclear power plant. The UN will be granted greater access for inspections. In exchange, Iran will receive relief from sanctions of approximately US$7 billion (£4.3 billion) and no additional sanctions will be imposed.

Sanction has been very bad for Iran.

GJELTEN: Celeste, these are the most severe sanctions ever put in place against any country in history. And you're right, they are not just from the United States. There are United Nations sanctions. There are sanctions from the European Union. The really important ones are the ones that have made it just about impossible for Iran to sell oil. And oil sales are really important to the Iranian economy. Last summer, the European Union stopped buying oil from Iran. The United States stopped, a long time ago, buying oil from Iran, but also has introduced sanctions where we punish other countries that are buying oil from Iran. So the effect of all that has really been to cut back hard on Iran's oil sales and, therefore, its oil revenues.

Eighty percent of its foreign exchange comes from oil sales, so that has really hurt. And then another big element - I mean, there's a long list of sanctions, but another big element is Iran has basically been kicked out of the, what's called the, SWIFT system, which is how you transfer money electronically. Literally now, Celeste, if Iran earns money overseas, it almost has to bring the cash back in suitcases. That's what it's come to. So it's really hurting Iran.

I'm reading this article about how the sanction eventually worked in bringing Iran back to the negotiation table.

There's widespread agreement that sanctions have worked, squeezing Iran financially and bringing its leaders to the negotiating table. Iran's economy is, by any measure, in terrible shape.

"The cost of living has gone up so fast for Iranians that they are absolutely stunned, and people are simply not able to maintain the middle-class lifestyles that they used to," Slavin says.

Iran's official inflation rate is about 40 percent. By comparison, inflation in the U.S. is less than 2 percent, and many outsiders believe prices are rising even faster in Iran than the government says, especially for food.

the massive plunge in the value of Iran's currency — the rial — over the past two years, has made inflation more pernicious. Because the rial is so weak, Iranians have to pay a lot more for imported goods. And oil, Iran's main export and the heart of its economy, is being sidelined by sanctions.

Folks in America would probably become crazy if the price of everything increased by 40% and the value of dollars became almost worthless.


As expected, not all the Iranians are happy with this new deal.

First, let’s read the views from the reactionary, non-thinking, no-vision, still sore losers faction from Iran hard-liners whose candidates didn't win the recent election (Iran election coverage on my blog link 1, link 2, link 3, link 4)

The news site Alef, affiliated with prominent conservatives, ran pieces questioning the agreement’s technical details (one piece noted discrepancies with what had been published in a White House briefing paper) and lamenting the position of weakness from which Iran had been forced to negotiate. “Why Was Zarif Empty Handed?” the site asked, arguing that “there is no doubt the agreement is oppressive” but that Zarif’s failures must be viewed in the context of the bargaining position he inherited from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s government.

The question of enrichment emerged on Monday as a point of contention, with some hardline sites like the newspaper Kayhan arguing that nowhere in the agreement had the West conceded Iran’s right to enrich. Much of the criticism raised a day after the agreement centered around its technical and economic aspects, as some conservatives and hardliners sought to present their objections in a substantive rather than partisan light. The website Fars News said it had done the math, and found that “the points gained and the points conceded didn’t add up,” arguing that by failing to secure lasting relief from oil and banking sanctions, Iran would still lose in a month what it had gained in the unleashing of some $4.2 billion of its foreign exchange reserves, previously frozen as a result of international sanctions.

The reformist faction, whose candidate is the current President of Iran had this to say:

The country’s reformist papers ran special editions on Sunday highlighting the agreement’s success in securing sanctions relief, and kept up the bright coverage on Monday. Photos of Zarif dominated the front pages, with the newspaper Arman-e Emrooz declaring that “We Must Give Zarif a Gold Medal,” the daily Aftab headlining “Smiling Diplomat: We Thank You,” and in the newspaper Ebtekar, “A Historic Dawn in Geneva.”

But not everyone is happy it seems.

Saudi Arabia with the support of Qatar and other despotic Sunni Arab regimes, currently fighting a proxy war against Iran-via-Syria, is very unhappy that a deal was reached between Iran and the West (namely the USA) especially after their petition to obliterate Hafiz al-Assad and most of Syria was rejected by the White House (remember Obama's infamous red line incident).

Saudi Arabia resented the fact that the US-Iranian talks had been kept secret from Saudi Arabia, and felt that it had been double-crossed by a major ally. "We will be there to stop them, wherever they are," he said. "we can't tolerate the blaring of Persian music in the middle of Homs"

Saudi Arabia, to put bluntly, sounds like a whinny little poodle.

Some members of the US Congress are very disappointed that the US under the leadership of Barack Obama made a deal with one of the countries in the axis-of-evil. (link)

Iran has a history of obfuscation that demands verification of its activities and places the burden on the regime to prove it is upholding its obligations in good faith while a final deal is pursued. – John Boehner (Republican)

The U.S. should not weaken existing United Nations Security Council demands that Iran fully suspend its nuclear activities, including enrichment. Loosening sanctions and recognizing Iran's enrichment program is a mistake, and will not stop Iran's march toward nuclear capability." - Eric Cantor (Republican)

“The disproportionality of this agreement makes it more likely that Democrats and Republicans will join together and pass additional sanctions when we return in December. It was strong sanctions, not the goodness of the hearts of the Iranian leaders, that brought Iran to the table. And any reduction relieves the pressure of sanctions and gives them the hope that they will be able to obtain a nuclear weapon - Sen. Chuck Schumer (Democratic)

“We need to be very, very careful with the Iranians. I don’t trust them. I don’t think we should trust them,” - Rep. Eliot Engel (Democratic)

Israel is also very critical of the deal. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu labeled the deal an "historic mistake".

The crux of the growing US-Israel divide is the fact that the two countries simply don't see eye-to-eye on Iran's nuclear program. The Israelis want a complete dismantling of Iran's capabilities – a position that is unrealistic and short of using military force is never going to happen. Iran has progressed so far along the road to developing a nuclear capability that the issue today is what is the best way to slow the program and prevent Iran from going nuclear rather than reversing it.

Indeed, if Netanyahu stepped back from his red line, he might actually realize that the deal signed in Geneva goes a long way towards meeting that goal. In fact, it is rather shocking the number of concessions the US and its western allies were able to secure in Geneva without giving up that much in return. Under the agreement, Iran must stop all uranium enrichment above 5% and neutralize its stockpile of uranium that has been enriched to 20%. In addition, Iran must halt construction at the Arak nuclear reactor (which was potentially capable of producing plutonium for a bomb) and end the production, installation and maintenance of centrifuges used for enrichment purposes.

Most opinions seem to be that this was a fair deal for Iran (in regards to their bargaining position) and a very very good deal for the world super powers (considering their wealth and position).

Iran's diplomat that made this deal possible is Mohammad Javad Zarif. After 8 years of embarrassment, international failure and diplomatic mishaps under Ahmadinejad, I guess Iran finally found someone that actually understand how to fix Iran's problem with the west. He sounds like an interesting guy.

Before leaving the hotel that morning, Zarif took a few moments to go up to his room on the 14th floor to update his Twitter and Facebook accounts. "We have reached an agreement," he tweeted at 3.03am local time.

With that simple message, the 53-year-old showed that President Hassan Rouhani's best decision upon assuming office was to appoint him as the man in charge of reviving Tehran's diplomacy, which had been badly damaged under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

According to Kamal Kharazi, a former Iranian foreign minister, it was Khamenei who personally gave Zarif permission to talk directly to the US at that time.

At the UN the ambassador was praised for his diplomatic manner even by the Islamic republic's sworn enemies. The former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger reportedly gave him a copy of his 1994 book Diplomacy, signing it "To Zarif, my respectful enemy".

Although it was Rouhani who chose Zarif as foreign minister, his appointment would have been impossible without the blessing of Khamenei, now Iran's supreme leader. It is widely believed that Zarif secured Khamenei's trust during his time at the UN by being an obedient servant, even though at times he held different views.

With more than 700,000 likes on Facebook and 87,000 followers on Twitter, Zarif is perhaps the Islamic republic's most popular diplomat since 1979.

Iran's response to Reuter's article

Reuters has published Iran's response to their three part article series about Khamenei's wealth and asset. Not surprisingly, Iran completely rejects the analysis and further accuses the authors of indulging in misinformation.

Reuters, however is standing by their claim.

Barb Burg, a Reuters spokesperson, said the news agency stands by the accuracy and fairness of its articles. Its estimate of Setad's net worth was based on an analysis of statements by Setad officials, data from the Tehran Stock Exchange and company websites, and information from the U.S. Treasury Department.

They didn't get back to the investigators/authors

A spokesman for Setad did not immediately respond to an emailed request for comment.

While critical of Reuters investigation, the IRNA text did not address Reuters key findings, namely the confiscation of property or Setad's stakes in nearly every sector of the Iranian economy, including finance, oil, telecommunications and pharmaceutical companies.

Iran didn't like the article very much, yet is not ready to reveal more information about all these organizations that are well connected to Khamenei.

Khamenei's Wealth and Power - Part 3

The third part of the article is out at the Reuters Investigates site. Part 1 and Part 2 is also available.

Many of you will find this article interesting because it attempt to uncover/unravel Khamenei's grip of power and influence on Iran for the past 24 years by inspecting organizations that are directly under his patronage.

The first organization is Setad.

The organization's total worth is difficult to pinpoint because of the secrecy of its accounts. But Setad's holdings of real estate, corporate stakes and other assets total about $95 billion, Reuters has calculated. That estimate is based on an analysis of statements by Setad officials, data from the Tehran Stock Exchange and company websites, and information from the U.S. Treasury Department. Just one person controls that economic empire – Khamenei. Reuters found no evidence that Khamenei is tapping Setad to enrich himself. But Setad has empowered him. Through Setad, Khamenei has at his disposal financial resources whose value rivals the holdings of the shah, the Western-backed monarch who was overthrown in 1979.

With those revenues, the organization also helps to fund the ultimate seat of power in Iran, the Beite Rahbar, or Leader's House, according to a former Setad employee and other people familiar with the matter. The first supreme leader, Khomeini, had a small staff. To run the country today, Khamenei employs about 500 people in his administrative offices, many recruited from the military and security services.

Setad, however, is a much broader operation than these foundations. It's unclear how much of its revenue goes to philanthropy. Iranians whose properties have been seized by Setad, as well as lawyers who have handled such cases, dispute the argument that the organization is acting in the public interest. They described to Reuters what amounts to a methodical moneymaking scheme in which Setad obtains court orders under false pretenses to seize properties, and later pressures owners to buy them back or pay huge fees to recover them.

According to one of its co-founders, Setad was meant to last two years. But under Khamenei's control, it remained in business, amassing a giant portfolio of real estate by claiming in Iranian courts, sometimes falsely, that the properties were abandoned. In
fact, many were seized from members of religious minorities, and business people and other Iranians living abroad.

Khamenei appoints Setad's board of directors but delegates management of the organization to others, according to one former employee. This person said the supreme leader is primarily concerned about one thing: its annual profits, which he uses to fund his bureaucracy.

As expected, the authors of this article couldn't get any comments or feedbacks from the people in charge of the organization. Even the Iranians that are currently serving in the governmental sectors are refusing to cooperate.

The second organization is the powerful Guards

"The Revolutionary Guards, the powerful military unit tasked with protecting Iran from both domestic and foreign threats, has long held a pivotal role in the country's economy, with extensive holdings in defense, construction and oil industries, according to the U.S. State Department.

According to Mohsen Sazegara, a co-founder of the Revolutionary Guards who is now in exile in the United States, Khamenei allowed the Guards to enter the construction business. That opening eventually enabled an engineering division of the Guards to evolve into a major conglomerate. In time the Guards became a pillar of Khamenei's power. So too did Setad.

"

The Guardian Council http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardian_Council

Even before then, Setad had been drawing attention from the reformist wing of the establishment. During Khatami's second term, moderate members of parliament sought to investigate Setad, according to Nayyeri. The Guardian Council, a body of conservative clerics and jurists who are directly or indirectly appointed by Khamenei, issued a declaration that Setad was beyond parliament's authority, Nayyeri said.

Elections in 2008 brought a strongly conservative parliament deeply loyal to Khamenei. In one of its first steps, parliament amended its bylaws to limit its own power to audit institutions under the supreme leader's supervision, except with his permission.

"This is the reason why no one knows what is going on inside these organizations," says Sazegara, the Guards co-founder.

Today, Khamenei's power in some respects exceeds that of his predecessor. He lacks the religious authority of Khomeini but has far greater resources at his disposal.

Khomeini operated from a modest house in northern Tehran with a small staff. Khamenei lives in a large compound in Tehran. The grounds contain a variety of buildings, including a large hall where Khamenei gives speeches. Setad helps to finance his administrative offices, which are known as Beite Rahbar, the Leader's House, according to a former senior Setad employee and other people familiar with its operations. It employs about 500 people, many recruited from the Guards and security services.

This is what I concluded from the article:
The authors stated that Khamenei never fails to portray himself as a highly religious and pious/modest scholar. Everyone agrees to that at least. The authors wanted us to disregard that for a moment, and examine the way he has consolidated his powers and wealth via private organizations (Setad, Revolutionary Guard,) that are not very transparent and are ridiculously faithful only to him. By giving these examples, one can compare the current supreme leader with the previous one; and unlike Khomeini, Khamenei is running a huge beuracray (thousands of time larger).

Authors attempted to highlight that Khameini is sitting comfortably on billions of dollars supposedly invested by his "companies" that supposedly work for the good of people. But since these organizations are only accountable to Khamenei and Khamenei is not accountable to anyone, so there's a disconnect between Khameini's public personality with what is going on privately in the background.

I think what is lacking in this article is maybe some more details or discussion on why the Leader of Iran needs his own private personal army and why he is operating these secretive and private organizations away from the other branches of the government or seperate from the office of the Presidency. Based on my observation, most of the supporters of the Wilayah al-Faqih system (Supreme Leader) claim that he is entitled to all these because of his position as the Supreme Leader. This doesn't really sit well with me because Shias generally don't believe in a temporal power on earth, at least not in the curent Era. I don't think Shias should make an exception for Iran due to a political system. Because everyone knows that this style of thinking has created many dictatorship with lifetime tenures. Look around you, they are everywhere.

Khamenei's Wealth and Power

I'm reading an article (published yesterday Nov, 11, 2013) about Iranian Supreme Leader's (Khamenei) Wealth and Assets. This is a three-part article. Part three will be out tomorrow.

A little bit of background first:

Khomenei, the founder of the Islamic republic of Iran, passed away in 1989. It was hard to find a successor that embodies Khomeini's qualification, leadership quality and charisma. The one person who knew the political system well and was a big supporter of it was sacked by Khomeini himself. The sacking of Khomeini's deputy, Montazeri, for irrecoverable differences became a huge scandal over the period of time among political Shias, especially since it was found later on that Montazeri was probably framed and had least blood on his hands than the rest of the political Ayatullahs. After participating in Khomeini's strict Islamic regime, the ever devious Hashemi Rafsanjani thought the least evil candidate was the humble junior Ayatullah with the least religious qualification and not overtly obvious political aspiration by the name of Ali Khamenei. Rafsanjani, playing on the emotions of Khomeini's supporters who by then were still distraught over the death of their leader, managed to swiftly pass Khamenei's candidacy across the now almost worthless majlis (assembly of experts) which then was responsible for evaluating Supreme Leader qualification and personality(?). Much has been written on this; look it up if you are interested. Over the years, Khamenei, knowingly or unknowingly, had assembled mass powers and also wealth for his supporters much to the disgust of the ordinary Iranians.


The article that I'm reading goes behind the secretive world of Iran's supreme leader; people and organization associated with him. Like always, everything that comes out of Iran are not 100% truth or false. So treat everything as if it's half-truth.

http://www.reuters.com/investigates/iran/#article/part1

http://www.reuters.com/investigates/iran/#article/part2

My Experience Watching Iran Election News Coverage and Celebration

I’ve been reading and following Iranian’s election news for more than a week now. The pre-election coverage was not very good. There are a number of contributing factors to this; namely

• Uncertainty about the candidates
• short campaign time (this was intentional)
• faulty polls (most of the polls were putting Qalibaf as the front-runner, Rowhani was not even in the list of the top three candidates)
• uncertainty about the voters (Iranians were very much undecided about their candidates.
• Also, many voters said they would be staying at home and not participating in the election) and
• western journalists/news media claiming they were not getting proper authorization to travel to Iran or bared from reporting in some cases (through threats and intimidation).

The Election Day started with Iran’s most famous VIP, the supreme leader (Rahbar) himself, casting his vote early morning. He said that not even his kids know whom he is voting for. This is so unlike four years ago where he specifically endorsed Ahmadinejad for the second term. The plan backfired and Ahmadinejad turned out to be the biggest thorn on his side. So, maybe this time he’s wise to keep quiet about his favorite choice. He urged all Iranians to vote even those who are not very supportive of the system/government (I rephrased what he said). And of course, no interview with Khamenei would ever be perfect without the obligatory condemnation of the west; Khamenei said ‘To Hell With you’ to the western powers who dared question the selection of their candidates and for saying how undemocratic their political system really is.

I was watching interviews with Iranians who were already in lines at the voting centers. A number of Iranians who initially said they were not planning to vote showed up anyway because they were persuaded by their family and friends. Many Iranians who voted for Rowhani said they want to see someone moderate for a change. Others who voted for Rowhani believe while he may not be the best candidate but they are still voting for him because he’s using a slightly different tone from other candidates. A lot of Rowhani’s supporters were among those who were worried about the economy, western backed sanction and personal freedom. Overall, no matter who the Iranians were voting for, they all said that coming out to vote is a social event or showing of the solidary for their country.

Guess who showed up in the late afternoon. The infamous ex-President of Iran, Ahmadinejad. I was expecting him to act like a punk but apparently he was somewhat subdued this time. I guess he’s no more than a toothless tiger now that he’s tenure is almost over and his plan to cling to power via his successor’s failed after it was foiled by the hardliners who saw him as a threat to their way of life. Though I still wonder what’s the future going to hold for him. The political outlook doesn’t look good for him since the reformists are now in the office of Presidency. And he had already burned all the bridges with the conservatives/hardliners.


The voting hours were extended at least four times right up to 11 pm. The result that was supposed to be announced at 3am was postponed until 8am Saturday. A lot of people were surprised at the hold-up. The result from 2009 Presidential election was announced within the two/three hours after the closure of voting centers. I’ve seen some people again expressing doubt and suspicious about the 2009 Presidential election and comparing with the clear victory for the reformists.

I woke up early on Saturday morning and tuned to Press TV (English) hoping to catch some live Iranian election reporting. I was very disappointed after awhile. PressTV was not covering the most important event in Iran! Their own election. They had news about a protest in Jordan. I initially thought the protest was about something very important because well..it had to be important to pre-empt their own election coverage. Nope, it was just a regular protest about Jordanians being unhappy with their economy. Okay, so I waited.

The next news item was a sandcastle competition in a European country. Then the news turned to hot air balloons. I was getting very impatient by then. Come on, where’s the election news. All they had was news ticker showing candidate’s vote count. But no real live TV coverage. I hardly watch Press TV. My last attempt to watch it was a year and half ago. I don’t think it covered anything I was interested in back then. I was hoping that at least this time as the official Iranian news channel, PressTV should have a monopoly on election coverage. But no such thing. For some reason, they were not interested in broadcasting their own election live and I guess I was in no mood to watch anything other than Iranian Presidential Election. The news section ended. A documentary about pig farming (Pig Business) was then aired. Argghh…this was getting hopeless. I turned off the TV and went online.

When the counting began to show a clear lead favoring Rowhani, people were ecstatic and very much in celebratory mode. Soon enough, the announcement came in that Rowhani had a clear victory and a mandate to form the next government. The online newspapers began showing Rowhani’s picture. I was reading news from a popular internet website. As soon as Rowhani’s picture emerged as the next President of Iran, the comments section was flaming with disappointing posts from users who didn’t know much about Iran’s politics. To them it was just a case of “Oh No! The Iranian Mullah won a victory for their regime”. Much later, some folks clarified that although Hassan Rowhani is dressed very much like a Mullah but his ideology is not aligned at all with the hardliners of Iran’s whose candidates are all dressed in western style suits (minus the tie because tie is a symbol of western imperialism :rolleyes: )

The Internet began to buzz with pictures and videos of celebration in Iran. Iranians were singing and dancing in the streets celebrating their victory. Congratulatory messages started coming in from the reformists. I’ve seen some people chanting support for Musavi and displaying sarcastic remarks about the 63% of the population who supposedly voted for Ahmadinejad's second term. Where are those people now? I’ve also seen remarks from people who hope Rowhani’s victory would guarantee a release of their political dissidents. Most of all people were hoping for a better life for the Iranians.

The conservatives/hardliners who had all of their candidates defeated, didn’t focus much on their defeat or say much about Rowhani’s victory or their gloomy outlook/future. Their newspapers on Saturday (and I didn’t read enough of them to form an objective opinion) painted the high voter turnout in the election as a victory against the west.

It’s too early to say how Rowhani’s presidency will look like. People are hopeful. We still have to wait and see.

Iran's new President is a Reformist

Hassan Rohani is Iran's new President. He defeated five conservatives (hardliners)/semi conservatives-independent convincingly with 51% of the votes. His closest rival, Qalibaf, managed to only get 16% of the votes. Jalili and Mohsen Rezaee are almost tied in the third place with 10-11%. Since one of the candidate have the majority of the votes, he won.

This is a stunning victory for the Reformists of Iran. I'm glad that they came together under a single candidate no matter how imperfect he was. Rohani is probably not the most ideal Reformists leader, but the body that selects Iran's Presidential candidate disqualified a lot of their candidates. After seeing today's result, I bet some members of the Guardian Council would be regretting their decision to eliminate Rafsanjani from the race. If they had only allowed Rafsanjani to run, he would've probably split the reformists vote between them. I don't think people like Rafsanjani can be persuaded to drop from a race or is win-able on a reformist ticket at least not in the current era. Most of his political life seems to be dedicated serving the establishment and he's also very wealthy. So, he has quite a bit of baggage.

Rezaee also did very well in this election. The supposedly front runner, Qalibaf, didn't deliver. The other establishment candidates were rejected by the Iranians.

Hassan Rohani will definitely face challenges from the unelected branch of government like the rest of other Presidents. But I hope he can improve the life of average Iranians and rein in the other side who think they represent the will of God. Hopefully, he can get many of the political prisoners out.

Interesting piece about Ahmadinejad’s Legacy

From Reza Aslan. Author of a couple of Islamic books.

According to him, the outgoing President of Iran will be best remembered not only for his cringe worthy statements but also for cracking the glass ceiling (of not questioning the rule of the Mullahs). I’m quoting him here

The mullahs' conflict with Ahmadinejad goes to the very heart of what constitutes political legitimacy in the Islamic Republic. In Iran's byzantine government, the elected president is supposed to represent the sovereignty of the people while the unelected supreme leader represents the sovereignty of God. In practice, however, nearly all levers of political power rest in the hands of the supreme leader, leaving the president with very little control over policy decisions.

That is just how the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, wanted it. Khomeini's religio-political concept of velayat-e faqih, or "guardianship of the jurist" argued that in the absence of the Muslim messiah (known as the Mahdi), the powers of government should rest with the messiah's representatives on Earth -- that is, the ayatollahs

In his second term, Ahmadinejad steadily chipped away at the clergy's religious, economic, and political control. First, he started questioning the mullahs' self-proclaimed status as the arbiters of Islamic morality -- and especially its obsession with proper Islamic dress.

The president then began repeatedly criticizing the clergy for their enormous wealth, which stood in stark contrast to most Iranians' economic suffering under international sanctions. In a surprise move, Ahmadinejad curtailed the amount of money that the government pays to religious institutions, which have ballooned over the past three decades into a source of tremendous personal enrichment for many in the clerical elite.

But Ahmadinejad's challenge to the clerical regime goes beyond any single skirmish with the supreme leader. Perhaps more important is his very public questioning of the foundation of the Islamic Republic's political and religious authority. "Administering the country should not be left to the [supreme] leader, the religious scholars, and other [clerics]," the president said in 2011.

Consider, for example, Ahmadinejad's much-maligned claims of being in direct communication with the Mahdi. Such statements are not the mad ravings of a religious fanatic -- they are a public repudiation of the entire system upon which the Islamic Republic was built. After all, if a layperson like Ahmadinejad can directly consult with the Mahdi, then what use are the ayatollahs? And if the clerics are not the only ones with a direct line to the Mahdi, why have they been given political powers over the Mahdi's government? As Mashaei put it, "Running a country is like a horse race, but the problem is that [the clerics] are not horse racers."

You should check out the whole piece here.

Iranians are either voting or not tomorrow

We haven’t been having good news coverage about the election in Iran. Most of the sources seem to be repeating the same thing over and over again. Based on an informal poll (don’t really know how reliable it is), the Mayor of Tehran is leading the race followed closely by Khamenei’s puppet Saeed Jalili. Reformists may or may not come together under Rowhani especially since the other Reformists guy who had more support has dropped out from the race. I think he did well, since splitting the vote between the two of them wouldn’t be good for either. Iran’s ex-Presidents, Rafsanjani and Khatami, have both endorsed the only Reformist candidate in the race.

I’ve been reading people’s opinions, inside and outside of Iran. I’m sensing that there’s a strong group of people who are pretty happy with the selection of the candidates. These people who are most likely to vote for Qalibaf or Jalili believe that in this tough time, Iran’s problems can only be resolved if they stick together under the leadership, support the best interests of Iran via strong revolutionary methods, being faithful to Islam and sticking up to western powers.

Mohsen Rezaee, another candidate, is Iran’s Ron Paul or Dennis Kucinich. He seems to be running in every race and not getting more than 2% of the vote. This time around, he may get more supporters (voters) since the biggest problem facing the Iranians is the economy and he seems to have some credibility in this area. It’s hard to say for sure if he’s going to become the lead contender since the odds are heavily stacked against him.

We haven’t seen much of the Reformists in politics, at least not since 2001. In the last election (2009), which was a complete disaster, their candidate Mir Hussain Mossavi, was defeated by the incumbent President, Ahmadinejad. Remembering the past, I think even in the time of Khatami when the reformists won both consequent elections with the highest votes ever; they faced much obstructions and oppositions from the unelected conservatives. And if you can’t change anything when you already have 70% of the country behind you then there’s really something wrong with the political system.

There’s a large group of Iranians who will not be voting in the election. Why bother to vote when the authority has already hand-picked the candidates and there’s no telling if your votes would even be counted. Are any of the candidates even remotely anti-establishment? I was reading an opinion of an Iranian who expressed deep hatred and contempt for Khamenei. To him, Khamenei is nothing but a dictator. When he heard Khamenei’s urging every Iranians to vote in Friday’s election, he adamantly refused to follow the order. He won’t be voting. :)

Since Iran is still situated in the region overrun with dictators, I think voting is a novel experience and so the Iranians should vote, even if to cast a blank vote or vote for everyone in the list. Ideally you should vote for the guy who you think is the best that will represent your interest. And if this is not possible then perhaps look for someone who is less against your interest. If you can’t find anyone to vote, then perhaps next time considering running in the election so you can vote for the most desirable candidate.

Ahmadinejad disappearing soon and for the good of everyone

Iranian Presidential Election is this Friday. In a country where the political system is not fully transparent or seems to be working for most, this election is going to be one of those rare events where the Iranians may feel some hope and excitement at the thought of having their voices/frustrations heard and possibly having their votes counted.

Ahmadinejad has not only been a complete disaster for Iran, but also a huge embarrassment. I’m constantly amazed at all the idiotic statements made by him and his overall immaturity. I didn’t really see much good in him. Seems to me whatever he achieved in his two terms as President of Iran was wiped away at the end of his second term.

Moving on.

Eight candidates were originally competing in this election. Two had dropped out so far. Eventually, we will have the top two candidates squaring off. Most of the candidates are either conservatives or ultra-conservatives (hardliners/very pro Khamenei). Not surprising to see all the conservative candidates lined up as presidential candidates since the body that cleared the pathway for them is also very much conservative. The only reformist candidate in this election is Hassan Rowhani.

It’s too early to say how the election will shape up despite the fact that the election is merely three days away. A possibility is to have the hardliner’s votes split among all the candidates assuming no one candidate is going to drop off from the race. Right now, the Mayor of Tehran, Mohammed Baqir Qalibaf has a slight edge among all the candidates.

Even though the election outlook for Iranians is not looking very good, but I hope that the reformists would come out in drove and vote for Rowhani. It’s a shame that they have abandoned their reform movement/agenda for sometimes now. Iranians have to find a way out of their crippling political system/process, be less discouraged and more persistent.

References

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-10/rohani-picks-purple-to-lure-iran-s-disillusioned-voters.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_presidential_election,_2013

http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21579041-eight-carefully-vetted-candidates-jockey-presidency-under-severe

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-06/11/c_132448462.htm

Iran’s election is becoming more interesting

After they disqualified the top two contenders – Rafsanjani (Iran’s two termed ex-President and also a very seasoned politician) and Mashaei (Ahmadinejad’s father in law).

Guardian Council, a very influential political group rumored to be very close to Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, selects and vet each candidate. Generally they disqualify candidates who are insane, homeless, irreligious and also female gender.

The daughter of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of Iran's Islamic republic, has protested against the disqualification of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani from next month's presidential election.

Zahra Mostafavi has written to the country's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, calling on him to reinstate Rafsanjani in order to prevent the forming of a dictatorship.

Both of the candidates seem to be very unpopular with Iran’s supreme leader so this news is not very surprising.

The following candidates have been approved as Presidential candidates

MP Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel,
Supreme National Security Council Secretary Saeed Jalili,
Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei,
Hassan Rohani, the director of the Strategic Research Center of the Expediency Council,
former First Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref,
Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf,
former Telecommunications Minister Mohammad Gharazi, and
former Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Velayati.

ref

Syria is a lose-lose situation

On one side you have the current secular dictator who inherited the government from his father and on the other side you have the murderers jihadist wahhabis/salafist whose are fighting for their fanatical ideas about Islam. Both sides seem to be equally bad.

Yesterday, I was listening to the Syrian refugee crisis on the radio. The situation is very bad.

Over 100,000 Syrian refugee living in cramped tents with very little water and almost no electricity.

More than half a million Syrian refugees have crossed into Jordan, and the number is expected to rise to 1 million by the end of the year.

Aid workers at Zaatari say they are overwhelmed by the job of providing services for a population that grows by more than a thousand every day, says Oxfam's Gluck.

"It's just a feeling that it's a flood that never ends. It's a deluge that you are trying to push back, and you're doing what you can," she says. "We are only providing the very basics here. They are getting the bare minimum."

Margaret Thatcher

I remember watching her on TV when I was little. Back then, I wasn't sure who she was exactly. I was too young to form complete picture about her. All I know was that she was the Prime Minister of London and for some unknown reason, she was referred to as the Iron Lady.

I don't like politicians. I don't find many good things to say about them. Politicians mostly serve their own interest or the interests of their family, relatives and friends. They don't serve people. People are merely pawn to be used to fulfill their evil private agenda.

The newspapers coverage in the US treated Margaret Thatcher like a celebrity except with more accomplishments and less gossip. Right-leaning reporters gleefully took the opportunity to reconnect with their Cowboy idol Ronald Reagen. Apparently, Thatcher and Reagen shared a common dream. Unregulated Capitalism. All the benefits of Capitalism were highlighted and all the evil/negative aspect of socialism were presented. Just like comparing apples to oranges.

I'm having a hard time thinking of anything positive about Margaret Thatcher. I guess some of the positive things I can observe from her life is that she manage to get into a very difficult career that was dominated mostly by males. She was also able to overcome her normal middle class upbringing to gain acceptance among people in a country that insanely reveres/obsesses over the royalty, the wealthy, people with titles, people with connections and soccer. Lastly, I think or at least I hope her legacy would include some of the things she didn't privatize - like the socialized UK health care system.

Interesting articles about Fadallah

I recently read two interesting articles about Fadlallah. The first article is by Michaelle Browers [1] entitled Fadlallah and the Passing of Lebanon's Last Najafi Generation. The central focus of the article was in tracing Fadlallah’s legacy. Author praised Fadhllah for his modern or rather independent thinking style and his opposition to the Wilayah al-Faqih system. Thus linking Fadlallah to the Najafi school of thought.

I'm summarizing the article here. Author’s original writing is also quoted properly.

At the start of the paper, the author quoted something from the Economist magazine about Fadlallah passing away.

No one of his stature can now gently counter Hizbullah’s claim to represent all Lebanese Shias or question its fealty to Iran. And there is one less ayatollah to challenge Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in his claim to lead all the world’s Shias.(Economist 2010)

Author highlighted possible choices for Lebanese Shias among the prominent marajas. I'm paraphrasing here.

• Khamenei. He would bring the Wilayah al-Faqih baggage on board.
• Sistani. His political engagement is very limited. His rules and opinions are very conservative and traditional. If you are already a fan of Fadlallah’s free thinking style, then you are probably not going to be happy with Sistani.
• Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayyad, the second most senior cleric in Iraq after Sistani.
• Muhammad Ibrahim Jannati, an Iranian Ayatullah.

The article had this to say about Fadlallah's and his office view on Taqlid

Shortly after Fadlallah’s death, his office announced on their website that it was permissible for those who emulated Fadlallah to continue to do so as long as a living religious authority deemed it permissible. A subsequent statement on(bayynat.org) affirmed that it is also permissible for those who have never emulated Fadlallah during his lifetime to start emulating him under the same circumstances. In response to inquiries as to whether or how Fadlallah is to be followed when new issues arise, the office  clarified that new issues must be referred to a living religious authority while at the same time affirming that Fadlallah comprehensively covered modern issues so that, at least in the short term, his opinions might suffice (see ‘Inquiries on Emulation’).

Still pretty confusing. How do you emulate a dead scholar? And why on earth would you pay a lip service to a dead scholar and then keep sending questions to other scholars? Can’t really blame the office though. The problem originates from Fadlallah’s own bizarre idea of Taqlid and I guess no one in the office seems to know how to proceed from here.

The article delve into Hizbullah (Nasrallah’s organization). The many members of that organization may seek Fadhlalah's advice on a variety of issues but on political matters, Ali Khamenei has the final say on everything (political).

The article traced some of Fadhlallah’s statements where he strongly rejected being the spiritual advisor of Nasrallah’s organization. The author is of the view that the relationship between Fadhlallah and Nasrallah/his organization is somewhat ‘strain'. Here's one of Fadlallah's statement:

The Lebanese Muslim youths have also benefited from my knowledge before Hezbollah was founded. And when Hezbollah was founded I was not a part of it and I used to tell them: ‚I am not a part of you because I do not engage in party politics. But, when you ask my opinion on some positions, I support them if I agree with them, otherwise I do not support them‛. (Fadlallah 2007)

I don't think one or two statements here and there mean much. Unless these statements are very serious in nature.

After presenting a glowing review about Fadhullah’s religious credentials, the author describe Fadhallah as a critic of the Wilayah al-Faqih system.

Fadhallah supported Khomeini's revolution, but he also followed his teacher al-Khoei. We have seen in other post that al-Khoei doesn’t really agrees to Khomeini's political ideology.

Then the author presented some background of Fadlallah becoming an independent or self-proclaimed marja.

Fadlallah was Al-Khoei's representative until 1992. He then followed Rida Gulypagani briefly until 1993. Later on, he followed al-Sistani. Finally becoming the marja himself

Author's quotes here

Thus, in 1994, Fadlallah decided to claim marja status for himself, despite the exhortation of Ahmad Jannati, who flew to Beirut as Khamenei’s personal envoy with the task of dissuading Fadlallah from declaring his marja‘iyyah .

As the highest ranking Arab marja.Fadlallah cultivates a considerable following throughout the region. Many Shi‘A in Lebanon,  Syria and various Gulf countries such as Bahrain and Iraq, view him and not Khamenei as the model for emulation (marja‘al taqlid) . He has offices in Syria, Iran, the U.K, Germany and the Ivory Coast (Maktab Fadlallah 2003)

The author summarized Fadhlallah’s view about Wilayah al Faqih quite well.

Fadlallah argues that all practicable routes toward the establishment of Islamic government should be pursued, but the idea of governing according the decisions of the mujutahid is not seen by him as very practical. Fadlallah refers to wilayat al-faqih as a juridical not a belief. Further, in light of the fact of the silence of the faqih and the fact of the multiplicity of fuqaha as well as the fact of the inevitable contradiction of their decisions, Fadlallah deems the notion of an absolute jurist is untenable. All jurists, no matter how wise, remain fallible, like all other believers. While arguing in some of his speeches and writings that Khomeini’s interpretation can be justified in the interest of safeguarding the community (e.g. 2000b, esp. 163)

Author quoted an example of where Fadlallah disagreed and corrected Nasrallah's general misunderstanding about an Islamic principle.

There have also been occasions when Fadlallah has taken the party to task for claiming to hold a monopoly on truth. For example, Nasrallah gave a speech prior to the 2005 election in which he declared it a taklif al-shar‘I (an obligation based on Islamic law) for Shi‘a to vote for the list Hizbullah endorsed. Fadlallah replied by using his 31 May 2005 column, The Stance of the Week’, to vehemently criticize the use of taklif shar‘I in the elections, arguing that such practices exploit Islamic concepts for political purposes(Fadlallah 2005)


According to Fadlallah, God has granted each person an independent mind for which we are each individually responsible. While an individual of religious  learning might be able to advise Muslims not to vote for corrupt candidates, the individual must decide for his or herself which candidate is corrupt and which is not.

Reference
[1] Michaelle Browers. "Fadlallah and the Passing of Lebanon's Last Najafi Generation." Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies 5.1 (2012): 25-46.

Fadlallah's Opinion about the Wilayah al-Faqih Political System

This post is a continuation of the Wilayah al-Faqih discussion. You may see my other posts labeled Wilayah al-Faqih by clicking on the tag.

Fadlallah, a recently deceased cleric, was the Ayatullah for a great number of Lebanese Shias. Many Lebanese were also following Nasrallah. The spiritual advisor of Nasrallah’s organization is Khamenei who is also the supreme leader of Iran. It’s not a secret that Khamenei’s and Nasrallah’s support for the Wilayah al-Faqih political system did seem at odd with Fadlallah’s rejection of that ideology. Here’s a direct quote from Fadlallah’s office in answer to the WF question.

The opinion of His Eminence the Sayyid (Long may he live) is that the general guardianship of the jurist is unfounded from the sources of law, as for returning to a jurist that has all the condition in general and upholds the guidelines that are related to the interests of Islam and the Muslims; the interest will be to return to this person in regards to this side of affairs.

Istifta Office for H.E. Grand Ayatollah
Sayyid Muhammed Hussain Fadlallah

He basically rejects the idea of Wilayah al-Faqih (guardianship or governance of a jurist) because its not supported by sources of Islamic laws.

Fadlallah seems to generate the most interesting controversies. A lot of time through no fault of his. However in this case, Fadlallah is not the first ayatullah to oppose Khomeini’s political ideology. We should probably look at all the Shia Ayatullahs who conditionally accept the system and also those who completely rejects the system.


I also noticed that after Fadlallah’s death, a lot of his followers switch taqlid and started following Khamenei. I wonder if these followers are now embracing the idea of Wilayah al-Faqih wholeheartedly or do some of them still have some reservations as their ayatullah did?

I personally find Fadhullah’s view on Taqlid pretty confusing. But I guess a thorough discussion on that topic will have to wait another day.

continue reading about Fadlallah.