Interesting articles about Fadallah

I recently read two interesting articles about Fadlallah. The first article is by Michaelle Browers [1] entitled Fadlallah and the Passing of Lebanon's Last Najafi Generation. The central focus of the article was in tracing Fadlallah’s legacy. Author praised Fadhllah for his modern or rather independent thinking style and his opposition to the Wilayah al-Faqih system. Thus linking Fadlallah to the Najafi school of thought.

I'm summarizing the article here. Author’s original writing is also quoted properly.

At the start of the paper, the author quoted something from the Economist magazine about Fadlallah passing away.

No one of his stature can now gently counter Hizbullah’s claim to represent all Lebanese Shias or question its fealty to Iran. And there is one less ayatollah to challenge Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in his claim to lead all the world’s Shias.(Economist 2010)

Author highlighted possible choices for Lebanese Shias among the prominent marajas. I'm paraphrasing here.

• Khamenei. He would bring the Wilayah al-Faqih baggage on board.
• Sistani. His political engagement is very limited. His rules and opinions are very conservative and traditional. If you are already a fan of Fadlallah’s free thinking style, then you are probably not going to be happy with Sistani.
• Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayyad, the second most senior cleric in Iraq after Sistani.
• Muhammad Ibrahim Jannati, an Iranian Ayatullah.

The article had this to say about Fadlallah's and his office view on Taqlid

Shortly after Fadlallah’s death, his office announced on their website that it was permissible for those who emulated Fadlallah to continue to do so as long as a living religious authority deemed it permissible. A subsequent statement on(bayynat.org) affirmed that it is also permissible for those who have never emulated Fadlallah during his lifetime to start emulating him under the same circumstances. In response to inquiries as to whether or how Fadlallah is to be followed when new issues arise, the office  clarified that new issues must be referred to a living religious authority while at the same time affirming that Fadlallah comprehensively covered modern issues so that, at least in the short term, his opinions might suffice (see ‘Inquiries on Emulation’).

Still pretty confusing. How do you emulate a dead scholar? And why on earth would you pay a lip service to a dead scholar and then keep sending questions to other scholars? Can’t really blame the office though. The problem originates from Fadlallah’s own bizarre idea of Taqlid and I guess no one in the office seems to know how to proceed from here.

The article delve into Hizbullah (Nasrallah’s organization). The many members of that organization may seek Fadhlalah's advice on a variety of issues but on political matters, Ali Khamenei has the final say on everything (political).

The article traced some of Fadhlallah’s statements where he strongly rejected being the spiritual advisor of Nasrallah’s organization. The author is of the view that the relationship between Fadhlallah and Nasrallah/his organization is somewhat ‘strain'. Here's one of Fadlallah's statement:

The Lebanese Muslim youths have also benefited from my knowledge before Hezbollah was founded. And when Hezbollah was founded I was not a part of it and I used to tell them: ‚I am not a part of you because I do not engage in party politics. But, when you ask my opinion on some positions, I support them if I agree with them, otherwise I do not support them‛. (Fadlallah 2007)

I don't think one or two statements here and there mean much. Unless these statements are very serious in nature.

After presenting a glowing review about Fadhullah’s religious credentials, the author describe Fadhallah as a critic of the Wilayah al-Faqih system.

Fadhallah supported Khomeini's revolution, but he also followed his teacher al-Khoei. We have seen in other post that al-Khoei doesn’t really agrees to Khomeini's political ideology.

Then the author presented some background of Fadlallah becoming an independent or self-proclaimed marja.

Fadlallah was Al-Khoei's representative until 1992. He then followed Rida Gulypagani briefly until 1993. Later on, he followed al-Sistani. Finally becoming the marja himself

Author's quotes here

Thus, in 1994, Fadlallah decided to claim marja status for himself, despite the exhortation of Ahmad Jannati, who flew to Beirut as Khamenei’s personal envoy with the task of dissuading Fadlallah from declaring his marja‘iyyah .

As the highest ranking Arab marja.Fadlallah cultivates a considerable following throughout the region. Many Shi‘A in Lebanon,  Syria and various Gulf countries such as Bahrain and Iraq, view him and not Khamenei as the model for emulation (marja‘al taqlid) . He has offices in Syria, Iran, the U.K, Germany and the Ivory Coast (Maktab Fadlallah 2003)

The author summarized Fadhlallah’s view about Wilayah al Faqih quite well.

Fadlallah argues that all practicable routes toward the establishment of Islamic government should be pursued, but the idea of governing according the decisions of the mujutahid is not seen by him as very practical. Fadlallah refers to wilayat al-faqih as a juridical not a belief. Further, in light of the fact of the silence of the faqih and the fact of the multiplicity of fuqaha as well as the fact of the inevitable contradiction of their decisions, Fadlallah deems the notion of an absolute jurist is untenable. All jurists, no matter how wise, remain fallible, like all other believers. While arguing in some of his speeches and writings that Khomeini’s interpretation can be justified in the interest of safeguarding the community (e.g. 2000b, esp. 163)

Author quoted an example of where Fadlallah disagreed and corrected Nasrallah's general misunderstanding about an Islamic principle.

There have also been occasions when Fadlallah has taken the party to task for claiming to hold a monopoly on truth. For example, Nasrallah gave a speech prior to the 2005 election in which he declared it a taklif al-shar‘I (an obligation based on Islamic law) for Shi‘a to vote for the list Hizbullah endorsed. Fadlallah replied by using his 31 May 2005 column, The Stance of the Week’, to vehemently criticize the use of taklif shar‘I in the elections, arguing that such practices exploit Islamic concepts for political purposes(Fadlallah 2005)


According to Fadlallah, God has granted each person an independent mind for which we are each individually responsible. While an individual of religious  learning might be able to advise Muslims not to vote for corrupt candidates, the individual must decide for his or herself which candidate is corrupt and which is not.

Reference
[1] Michaelle Browers. "Fadlallah and the Passing of Lebanon's Last Najafi Generation." Journal of Shi'a Islamic Studies 5.1 (2012): 25-46.

Fadlallah's Opinion about the Wilayah al-Faqih Political System

This post is a continuation of the Wilayah al-Faqih discussion. You may see my other posts labeled Wilayah al-Faqih by clicking on the tag.

Fadlallah, a recently deceased cleric, was the Ayatullah for a great number of Lebanese Shias. Many Lebanese were also following Nasrallah. The spiritual advisor of Nasrallah’s organization is Khamenei who is also the supreme leader of Iran. It’s not a secret that Khamenei’s and Nasrallah’s support for the Wilayah al-Faqih political system did seem at odd with Fadlallah’s rejection of that ideology. Here’s a direct quote from Fadlallah’s office in answer to the WF question.

The opinion of His Eminence the Sayyid (Long may he live) is that the general guardianship of the jurist is unfounded from the sources of law, as for returning to a jurist that has all the condition in general and upholds the guidelines that are related to the interests of Islam and the Muslims; the interest will be to return to this person in regards to this side of affairs.

Istifta Office for H.E. Grand Ayatollah
Sayyid Muhammed Hussain Fadlallah

He basically rejects the idea of Wilayah al-Faqih (guardianship or governance of a jurist) because its not supported by sources of Islamic laws.

Fadlallah seems to generate the most interesting controversies. A lot of time through no fault of his. However in this case, Fadlallah is not the first ayatullah to oppose Khomeini’s political ideology. We should probably look at all the Shia Ayatullahs who conditionally accept the system and also those who completely rejects the system.


I also noticed that after Fadlallah’s death, a lot of his followers switch taqlid and started following Khamenei. I wonder if these followers are now embracing the idea of Wilayah al-Faqih wholeheartedly or do some of them still have some reservations as their ayatullah did?

I personally find Fadhullah’s view on Taqlid pretty confusing. But I guess a thorough discussion on that topic will have to wait another day.

continue reading about Fadlallah.

Still Here

I'm still here. I really want to blog everyday, but sometimes I can't write anything. And if I'm not in the mood, I don't force myself.

Anyway,

I've recently come across a post from an anonymous poster on ShiaChat who confessed to have converted to Islam. I was totally surprised. Never expected him to ever become a Muslim.

Based on my reading of his posts, he always come across as someone who is pretty confidence about his faith/a lack of faith. Whenever he argues something, he's rarely emotional. I would put his ideology as a staunch but a sensible atheist.

And from my limited personal experiences with atheists, they don't suddenly convert to a religion. No matter how great an argument you think you are making, they are not going to buy into it.

That makes me wonder if he was an agnostic all along.

The belief of Musa al-Kadhim being the Qaim

This is the second part from yesterday's post. After this post, I'll probably not be talking about them for a long time unless I find something really interesting.

The belief of Imam Musa al-Kadhim being the Qaim (the Mahdi)

The belief that al-Kadhim would be the Qa'im seems to have already spread to some extent within the Imami community when al-Kadhim was still alive. This seems to be a result of the circulation of a hadith in which al-Sadiq was related to have said that the seventh Imam would be the Qa'im.

This created an expectation that it was al-Kadhim who would establish justice and equity on earth. For that reason, when the Imam died in custody in Baghdad, the 'Abbasid vizier Yahya b. Halid al-Barmaid ordered it to be announced that Musa al-Kadhim whom the Shia (al-Rafida) claim was the Qa'im who would not die, had died and that they should come and look at his dead body.

Although the identity and the number of these people are not known, they must have been a considerable number of people since the government delayed the Imam's funeral by displaying his body on a bridge in Baghdad for three days in order to convince the people of al-Kadhim's death.

All the Waqifa agreed that Imam Musa al-Kadhim went into concealment and would return some day and carry out the tasks of the Qa'im. However, there was disagreement among them about the immortality of the Imam and the function of 'All al-Rida who had already been proclaimed as the new Imam by a number of the followers.

Here’s what is written about the Waqifa

Many Waqifas thought that al-Kadhim had not died. He went out from the prison in which he was kept by the 'Abbasids and nobody saw him after that. But the caliph Harun al-Rashid falsified this fact and announced that al-Kadhim had died.

These followers circulated a hadith in which al-Sadiq said that if al-Kadhim head was rolled down to them from a mountain, they should not believe it, because he was the Qa'im.

In another hadith al-Sadiq said:

"Whosoever comes to you and tells you that he has nursed my son, closed his eyes, washed his body, put him in his grave, and shaken off his hands the dust of his grave, do not believe him".

• Other Waqifis accepted the death of al-Kadhim. An opinion of one group of Waqifa was that al-Kadhim after his death, returned to the world and went into hiding where he continued to command his followers. A small selected group of his disciples was able to visit him and see him. They relied on a hadith attributed to al-Sadiq that the Qa'im was called so because he would rise (yaqumu) after having died.
• The opinion of another group was that al-Kadhim died and he would return sometime near the day of resurrection, like Jesus, to fill the earth with justice as it was filled with injustice and despotism. They relied on a statement ascribed to al-Sadiq that in al-Kadhim there was a resemblance with Jesus and he would be killed at the hands of "the children of al-'Abbas".

All these sects were called the Waqiffa. The majority of them did not accept any Imam after al-Kadhim and they categorically rejected the imamate of 'Ali al-Rida.

However, some of them gave some place to him and the following Imams from his descendants in their beliefs. They did not accept them as Imams; they were only the representatives of al-Kadhim until he would return to the earth as the real Imam.

There was another group which could be regarded as the skeptical Waqifa. They considered the contradictory statements about the life of al-Kadhim equal in reliability. They also did not regard the traditions of al-Rida's designation to the imamate as explicit enough for them to set aside other traditions showing al-Kadhim as the last Imam and the awaited Qa'im. Therefore, they decided to wait and did not come to any conclusion about the matter until the truth emerged.

• Al-Nawbahti reports that many people from this group later accepted al-Rida's imamate and joined his party.
• Al-Tusi in his Rijal indicates fifty-four Waqifi names among the disciples of al-Kadhim. This number is about one fifth of all the disciples of the Imam whose names are given by al-Tusi.
• No work of the Waqifa has reached us. Only al-Tusi relates a large number of Waqifi hadith in his Kitab al-Gaybah in order to criticize them. These forty-one traditions were quoted from the book of 'Ali b. Ahmad al-'Alawi. Al-Tusi says that the author wrote it to support the Waqifi belief.

Reference

[1] The Schism in the Party of Mūsā al-Kāẓim and the Emergence of the Wāqifa

Waqifa, their sub-sects and other sects similar to them in belief

This post is based on this article[1]. I’ve covered Waqifa in a few other posts, but this entry will be more comprehensive and will cover the background of the Waqifa sects.

• The Waqifa sect stopped (waqafa) their line of Imams with the seventh Imam Musa al-Kadhim. They did not accept any other Imam after him.
• Another group called the Qafi'ya declared that Ali al-Rida was their new Imam after Musa al-Kadhim. The Shia Imamiyya has also accepted Ali al-Ridha as their eight Imam.
• A sect called the Mufawidda claimed that al-Husayn b. 'Ali b. Abi  Talib had NOT been killed in Karbala. They maintained that he was raised to the heavens just like Jesus who had been raised before.
• After the death of Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya in 81 H or 700 AD, several groups, who were generally called the Kaysaniyya, declared that he had not died and he was the Qa'im.
• A sub-sect of Kaysaniyya believed that Muhammad al-Hanafiyyah was on the hill of Radwa between Mecca and Medina. He was nourished by God with food and drink. A lion on his right and a tiger on his left always protected him and this would continue until his reappearance.
• An extremist sect called the Bayaniyya believe his son, Aba Hasim ibn Muhammad al-Hanafiya, was also the Qaim. They stopped their line of Imams with him and started to wait for his reappearance.

But that’s not all. Even the father and grandfather of Imam Musa al-Kadhim were target of similar claims after their deaths.

• A small sect called the Baqiriyya believed in Imam Muhammad al-Baqir's concealment. The group maintained that he was the Mahdi-Qa'im and this fact had been told by the Prophet to Jabir b. 'Abd Allah, a Medinite disciple of the Prophet who is said to have met with al-Baqir. The Prophet told Jabir that he would meet the Qa'im and, when it would happen, he should give the Prophet's greeting to him.
• Another  group  called  the  Nawusiyya denied  al-Sadiq's  death  proclaiming  him  as  the  Qa'im.
• Similarly,  a  body  of  proto-Ismalis rejected the  death  of  Isma'il  b.  Ja'far  during  his  father's  lifetime  and  alleged  that  his  death  was  merely a plot of al-Sadiq's to save Ismail from the 'Abbasid persecution. Al-Shahrastani designates  this  group "al-Ismaliyya al- Waqifa".

All  these  groups  stopped (waqafa) their line of Imams with a particular Imam. The  name  Waqifa is  generally  used  in literature for those Shia's who believed Imam Musa al-Kadhim to be the  Qa'im.  

Reference

[1] The Schism in the Party of Mūsā al-Kāẓim and the Emergence of the Wāqifa

al-Khoei opinion on Wilayah al-Faqih

When I was a teenager, I’ve always believed that the Shia scholars in Najaf, Iraq had a very pessimistic political outlook. Back then, I couldn’t understand why they would not wholly and fully embraced Khomeini’s political thoughts/ideology…

One of the most influential Shia scholars who didn't believe in Khomeini's Wilayah al-Faqih political system was al-Khoei. He lived in Iraq for the most of his life. He died in 1992.

Khomeini spent some time in Iraq before he was asked to leave by the Iraqi Bathist party.

I personally felt al-Khoei’s opinions about Wilayah al-Faqih political system invaluable. al-Khoei was acquainted with Khomeini's political ideas.

I remember my earliest discussion in mid 90s with an extremely religious family originally from Southern Iraq who knew al-Khoei. They were very reluctant to talk about politics. The brutal Iraqi dictator was still alive and they still had family members living under the dictator. But we did talk a little bit about it.

Nope, they didn’t bash Khomeini at all. I even recall a number of positive things that were said about him. I sense back then, most Iraqis in general didn’t like the Iranians that much. Iran-Iraq war was still fresh in their mind, and almost every family has lost family members or friends to the war. So, I didn’t expect them to be so level headed.

I'm unable to reconstruct the whole conversation. But here’s the gist of it, anyway

al-Khoei strongly rejected Khomeini’s Wilayah al-Faqih system in its entirety. His main disagreement was not that he agreed with some parts of the system and disagreed with the rest. He completely dismissed the concept of political rule by Islamic jurist or Faqihs (religious scholars).

Al-Khoei’s views may seem quite revolutionary by the current standard, but it is very much in line with the core Shia belief. Since we completely lack any textual sources or evidences that could provide some legitimacy to the Wilayah al-Faqih political system, so why should anyone feel obligated to support, participate or even promote it?

You should be able to find proper references from his writings if you search for “al-Khoei views on wilayah al faqih. I’m leaving you a link here, but feel free to carry out your own independent research.

Ayatullah Khu`i in his book 'rejects' Wilayat al-Faqih by saying:

Translation: : In the time of Ghayba there is absolutely no evidence that proves the Wilayah of the Fuqahah. Wilayah is only the prerogative of the Prophet and Imams. The Fuqahah not only don't have Wilayah in general affairs, but they also do not have any legal Wilayah in non-litigious affairs. (Reference to the discussion topic)

My Focus on the WF System

I've summarized political thoughts of the conservative (orthodox) Shias in my last post.

Shias are not allowed to setup a political system, government or even participate in one.

By conservative Shias, I meant those ancient scholars that lived right after the time of the twelfth Imam, before and after occultation.

But like everything else in the world, ideas and thoughts evolve over a period of time.

You'll always find scholars who agree with something and then find a group of scholars who disagree with everything.

When I started posting information about the Safavid of Iran, I was hoping to cover at least the Safavid political system. Here, I was mainly interested to see how the Shii Scholars viewed the Safavid and the level of their cooperation. There seems to be some interesting developments in the Shia political thoughts in the time of safavid and before. Hopefully we can revisit this topic in the future.

Let's move back to the Wilayah al-Faqih political system.

I've come to the conclusion that it's pretty pointless to go deeply in the theoretical framework of the Iranian political system. If someone is really interested, he/she can easily find all the details. You can search about the Iranian constitution, countless sites and discussions about Wilayah al-Faqih system, books and articles about Khomeini and the Iranian revolution. I trust you to do the homework.

I'm going to only focus on the hot issues (controversies) in the wilayah al faqih political system (theoretical and implementation).

continue reading.

This viral video is worth checking out

This youtube video has gone viral http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPKKQnijnsM

Wealth Inequality in America.

Hugo Chavez Dead

He died yesterday. Some of the news networks covered his life story extensively. I don't know much about him. But I learn a bit yesterday.

I think it was the best time for him to die. Had he live longer, then his supporters would've probably made him into a saint, which he clearly isn't.

The country is left in the hands of the vice president, the ex-bus driver. The vice president sounds a bit crazy. Think the western government gave Chavez cancer. I wouldn't be surprised if some fanatical crazy supporters would buy into the propaganda.

The belief of Shias concerning Islamic Political System/Government

I'm not able to add any references due to a lack of time. I may revisit this topic in the future to update the post and insert proper references

The following statements briefly describe the belief of Shias concerning Islamic Political System/Government headed by the Ahl al Bayt

• A legitimate Islamic government must be lead/head either by the Holy Prophet (pbuh) or his successors among the ahl al Bayt.
• The Shias believe the Holy Prophet (pbuh) named all his successors before his passing away. The first was Imam Ali and the last Imam Mahdi.
• The Shias also believe that the Prophet's successors (Imams) are divinely selected and inspired. These Imams are infallible (sinless) based on some verses of the Holy Quran and Prophetic traditions.
• The Shias believe most of the Imams were unfairly forced out of the political process. The Imams were oppressed and killed due to them being perceived as legitimate challenger to the corrupt monarchies and dynastic rulers of their time.
• Shias believe all the Imams after Imam Hussayn (as) kept away from politics and did not embrace nor promote anyone else for the role of leadership of the Islamic Ummah (Muslim Empire)
• The Shias are waiting for the twelfth Imam (Imam al-Mahdi) to make his appearance, rid the world of evil and rule based on justice and the pure uncorrupted teaching of Islam. The Sunnis are also waiting for Imam Mahdi but they believe he’s some random guy not at all connected to the Shia Imam.

That’s not all.

In addition, we may also find a number of tradition/hadiths that speaks about all the corrupt governments before the re-appearance of Imam al-Mahdi(aj) and the responsibility of the Shias in the time of occultation

• The Shias must not established governments/political systems
• The Shias must not participate nor support governments that are hostile to ahl al bayt
• All governments and political system before Imam’s re-appearance will be corrupt

continue reading

Whose Revolution is it?

We are privileged to be living in a time where countries of the middle east are going through endless regime changes; The Tunisian had their revolution, The Egyptians had theirs, The Libyans had theirs.

The Iranians had theirs, a long time ago. In 1979. That's the year the Iranians overthrew their dictator (Shah).

Based on my observation, the overzealous supporters of Khomeini/Wilayah al-Faqih/Iranian Government don't seem to recognize nor appreciate people's effort in making this revolution a success. For them, everything is about Khomeini. Khomeini did this, Khomeini did that. And Khomeini did that too.

There appears to be a cult worshipping the personality of Khomeini. And the Iranian Government is the main backer of this cult. They are solidly behind all the efforts to make Khomeini appears larger than his life. And they have been very successful so far, except last year. That's the year, when they were using a cardboard-sized Khomeini.

Here's a picture of the cardboard cut-out of Khomeini walking down the staircase off a plane, mimicking his arrival in '79.


Here's cardboard cut-out of Khomeini sitting down and having tea with his supporters


These pictures are not photo shopped. The Iranian officials actually made the prop for a festival (commemorating the Iranian revolution).

Of all the stupidest gimmick, this one takes the cake.

I sense that the Iranian Government is getting a lot of mileage from playing with people's emotions and memories of the past events. The Iranians participate in a number of Government backed mini-events and celebrations, all having links to Khomeini's political ideology and philosophy

• The revolution day. One the most significant day in their political calendar. Khomeini's prominent chant “Death to the Great Satan” can still be heard and seen on streets.
• Khomeini Quds day: Iranians and their supporters participate in pointless rallies around the world. Marching down streets with colorful banners, feeling pretty good about themselves.
• Khomeini's Shia-Sunni Unity Week. This week coincide with the two dates generally accepted as the birth date of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). I personally don't think the Shia and Sunni should have a religious unity. People should be free to practice whatever brand of Islam they believe is correct no matter how crazy it appears to other Muslims. Muslims should learn to live together play nicely and co-exist peacefully. I personally finds the whole concept of Unity among Muslims a glaring hypocrisy considering how much the Muslim communities are impacted by the sectarian violences around the world (from the past, current and possibly in the future).
• Another ridiculous day in the Iranian political calendar it the yearly anniversary of the US Embassy Takeover by radical students. Why would anyone celebrate this event?

I'm not able to list all the Khomeini centric activities and festivals. Too many to list here. You get the point.

His followers among the younger generations, who have watched some old videos of him; giving speeches, interviewed by journalists or even doing mundane everyday tasks, say Khomeini exhibit an aura of holiness.

Khomeini does have a charismatic personality. I'll give you that.

But comparing Khomeini to other personality like Che Guevara is inaccurate. Both men are not alike at all.

Che Guevara was a freedom fighter, a socialist promoting the brotherhood of all men as an equal, an atheist (Zindiq), with a very poor hygiene.

Khomeini was a clergyman, a very strong believer of God, who promoted the brotherhood of clerics before the people and had a very good personal hygiene.

continue reading.

Lets get started with the Islamic Government

The first book you should read is Hukumah al-Islamiyah (the Islamic Government/Governance). It's a collection of lectures on Khomeini's political ideology, thoughts and aspirations. This book has been translated to many languages. You can even download some translations online.

I read the book for the first time when I was a teenager. Back then, I remembered being intrigued and captivated. This wasn't my first introduction to Khomeini. I was already aware of his political success and achievements. Who hasn't?

I guess it's natural for people who already believed in Usoolism to take it further. If you consider your Ayatullah (marja e taqlid / the high-ranking Shia scholar) as a source of guidance/emulation in religious affair then what's stopping you from following him in other matters, such as, business, economics, politics and real-estate?

A few years ago, I revisited Khomeini’s political ideology. What looked rational back when I was younger, doesn’t seem believable now.  Khomeni’s political philosophy seems outdated (stale) and a bit exaggerated from reality. I guess I'm in the minority here since a lot of people (Shias and non-Shias) are still holding steadfast and promoting his political thinking.

The book Hukumah al-Islamiyah portrays Islamic governance into/as an idealistic form. When everything looks idealistic, then it’s hard for anyone to disagree with it.

In a section of the book, dealing with the qualities and qualification for the person/leader holding the leadership of the muslim nation, Khomeini quoted a number of traditions from Imams of ahl al bayt. These traditions are very familiar to Usoolis who are making the case of why they are following a Faqih (Jurist).

In one tradition, Imam specifically told his followers (Shias) to follow the leadership of Shias who are well-versed in their traditions (hadiths narrators). Most Shias already see the virtue and wisdom of following those who are aware/well versed with the teaching of the Imams. That's the main argument used by Khomeini; It makes perfect sense for Faqihs to be followed and obeyed in political matters since they will be the most perfect persons to realise the Islamic governance.

continue reading