Real or Fake Sayyeds?

Sayyeds are the descendent of the Holy Prophet from his daughter Fatima. There are millions of Sayyeds around the world (almost in every countries). Sayyeds generally enjoy a greater degree of respectability and honor in the community due to them being given the privilege of being related to the Holy Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and his daughter Fatima.

As the years pass by, the genealogical chart/family tree of the Sayyeds became more complex with the number of them increasing rapidly. You lose track of some of your family members (i.e inter marrying with the local population who may not be Sayyed-aware, re-location to other part of the world etc).

As to be expected, when family connection can gain you that extra leverage/advantage, material or non-material, then everyone would be tempted to have that special connection to the family of the Prophet of Islam, especially when the rewards are far greater than the risk. The risk of being exposed is almost negligible. Most people are not even aware of their own ancestors much less other's ancestors. This certainly explains why we have a very large number of Sayyeds in the world today who may not even be remotely related to the Holy Prophet, either knowingly or unknowingly.

I promised to reproduce some sections from an article that I read recently. This article may give some insight into the emergence of fake Sayyeds in the Middle east. Unfortunately, it seems to be a lengthy piece and contains many tangential discussion. So, I am only going to post the most significant part of the article. Please read the original article if you wish to learn more. I cannot really verify the authenticity of this material. I am just not knowledgeable enough in this area. So, please read the following section with a grain of salt.

This is an excerpt from an original article found in a book. Footnotes have been removed for a better reading experience. The following sub-sections are created (here) to organize the information.


On page 55 of the book[1], the author of the article described the economical condition in Qajar Persia and its demographics

Demographics
Data are reported by the Russian traveler Shopen in 1852: that in Urdubad, a small town with about 3,500 inhabitants, the high-ranking ulama represented 1 percent, the mullas 2 percent, and sayyids 31 percent of the population. In Erivan, a town of 11,500 inhabitants, there was a mulla for every 100 Moslems. There were 50 mulla and 39 sayyid families, which represented less than 1 percent of the population.

in Akda, a village of 1,200 inhabitants, the British frontier commission received a visit from the 5 principal men of the place—4 of whom were sayyids, out of 100 in the village. Some villages consisted almost entirely of sayyids, but these were exception to the rule that the number of religious professionals who lived in villages were few. In the tribal areas very few religious professionals were found. Tribal chiefs might have a mulla in their entourage, "who acted as secretary and chaplain."

Clerics and Scholars
"The priesthood of Persia are almost all Syeds," Malcolm reports. Polak goes even farther, stating that you can only become a mujtahid, shaykh al-islam, or imam-jum a if you are a sayyid. Indeed it would seem that sayyids dominated those functions throughout the nineteenth century in Qajar Persia as they did the ranks of the ulama (35%) in the shrine cities of Najaf and Karbala. Their number was probably higher among the ulama in Persia itself, because the religious community in the shrine cities constituted a more open system. The sadat-e 'ali, or first-rank sayyids, occupied the leading religious
functions, in particular those granted by the state and the well-paid functions in the shrines. The lower-class sayyids had to fend for themselves in the market, as we will see.


Nevertheless, the ulama were a much more open group than any other social class. Also, they were more inclined to reward piety and scholarly excellence than family ties.

Litvak has shown that non-clerical origins dominated among ulama who immigrated to the shrine cities, as opposed to those born there. On the other hand, many who held "hereditary" religious functions often did not study in [the] Iraqi shrine cities, but in Persia itself, thus maintaining a more closed system.

The working-class religious professionals included the rural mullas, the managers of small shrines, mosques, and madrasas (seminaries), and further, low-level teachers at the madrasas and the Qur'anic schools (maktab), the pulpit preachers and reciters of panegyrics, seminarians (tullab), and the lower-class sayyids. All these were financially and otherwise dependent on their masters.

The Razavis, or descendants of Imam Reza, enjoyed special privileges in Mashhad, where the Imam Reza is buried, and "comparatively few of them apparently work for their living." 

Descendants of 'Ali through his offspring from other women are called 'Alavi sayyids.

Although it all started with a woman, Fatima, sayyids who were descended from a male sayyid were known as sharif and ranked higher than those who were descended from a sayyida mother only.

Because of their descent, sayyids enjoyed general respect and immunity from normal state regulations. Therefore, a chief sayyid was responsible for the behavior of the sayyids, for only a sayyid could judge another sayyid. In the past such a chief sayyid was called naqib al-ashraf or naqib
al-mamalek, but in Qajar times this official was generally referred to as ra'is-e sadat. The
naqib was the overseer of all dervish groups.

Please continue to read part 2.


Reference
[1] Walbridge, Linda S. (2001). The Most Learned of the Shi`a: The Institution of the Marja Taqlid. USA: Oxford University Press. p. 55. ISBN 978-0-1951-3799-6.